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Abstract 
Finding the Unique Balance: Local Government Representation on the Boards of  
Regional Intergovernmental Organizations (RIGOs) 
 
James Arthur Rickabaugh, PhD 
 
University of Pittsburgh, 2018 
 
 
 
Regional Intergovernmental Organizations (RIGOs) are coalitions consisting primarily of 
municipal and county governments who develop a broad array of regional plans and policies; 
they also allocate federal and state funding to projects including transportation, community 
development, and economic development. Decisions about these policies and allocations are 
made by the RIGO board. This dissertation demonstrates the variety of different governance 
structures in place in RIGOs across the United States and introduces methods to quantify local 
government representational rights on RIGO boards. While much of the literature has previously 
described these boards as being overwhelmingly “one member, one vote”, coding and analyzing 
the original governance documents shows that most RIGO collective choice arrangements 
balance institutional membership and population proportionality in complicated and thoughtful 
ways. The dissertation develops a typology of membership that reflects the various ways in 
which counties and municipalities can be members, including through multijurisdictional 
membership processes. Two formulas that reflect the institutional membership and population 
proportionality are introduced to quantify the extent to which each board is “one member, one 
vote” and “one person, one vote.” The balances agreed to by local governments often more 
closely resemble how international organizations agree upon representational rights than they do 
the US House or the US Senate. These formulas are further applied to two RIGOs to show their 
use comparing governance proposals and to show changes in collective choice arrangements 
over time. 
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1.0 Introduction 
This dissertation demonstrates that the representational rights of local governments 
within Regional Intergovernmental Organizations (RIGOs) are a complex balance of myriad 
factors, including population disparities among members and the varying roles of municipalities 
and counties.  Both Bryan and Wolf (2009) and Miller, Nelles, Dougherty & Rickabaugh (2018) 
have acknowledged that the role of voluntary associations of local governments like Councils of 
Governments, Regional Councils, Regional Planning Commissions, and Area Development 
Districts are overlooked in the regional governance literature, including their collective choice 
arrangements. Much of the work that investigated these organizations from a wider scope is now 
more than twenty years old (Dodge, 1996; Mogulof, 1971; Wikstrom, 1977). More recent work 
has focused quite heavily on case studies or within a narrowed geographic scope (J. L. Hall, 
2008; Kwon & Park, 2014; Lindstrom, 2010; Luna, 2015; Teitz & Barbour, 2007; Visser, 2004). 
The result is a piecemeal understanding of these organizations, lacking underlying conceptual 
structure and empirical breadth. With this limited scholarship, the possibility is strong that 
outdated or inaccurate information perpetuates unchallenged into conventional wisdom. One 
such example of this conventional wisdom is that these organizations are overwhelmingly 
governed in a one-member, one-vote structure (Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental 
Relations, 1973; J. S. Hall, 2009; Kramer & Bond, 2010; Teitz & Barbour, 2007; Wikstrom, 
1977; Wyman, 1994). This research may have been accurate at the time and the institutions have 
evolved since, the survey methods did not adequately account for the specifics of a local 
government’s representational rights, or other limitations. The purported consequence is that the 
center cities are at a disadvantage under this governance model (Benjamin, Kincaid, & 
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McDowell, 1994; Frisken & Norris, 2001; P G Lewis, 1998; Sanchez, 2006). John Stuart Hall 
typifies the consequences of this when he writes: 
 
“[Councils of Governments] with rules like ‘one jurisdiction, one vote’ are perfect 
examples of the structural problem facing regions. Despite the fact that these organizations come 
closest to being a region-wide policy voice, they often must avoid the most pressing problems of 
the region, particularly those that are most severe for central cities.” (Hall 2009, pg. 71)  
 
This dissertation updates and tests that conventional wisdom using Miller & Nelles’s 
national database (2018)1 of Regional Intergovernmental Organizations (RIGOs); the results 
presented here show this conventional wisdom needs to be updated. Contrary to conventional 
academic opinion, RIGO boards are structured in highly diverse ways that correspond to the 
political structures in place and differences in population; the governance documents are 
intentionally crafted through negotiations and evolve as regions do. 
If jurisdictions are given an equal number of votes, as Hall and others have suggested, 
this implies that counties and municipalities are treated the same both between and amongst one 
another. Membership associations function, at least in part, to best serve the members. The 
resources, powers, and responsibilities can vary greatly between one organization’s counties and 
municipalities, between its large counties and small counties, and between its center cities and 
suburbs. It would follow then that these local governments would have varying needs for 
regional governance.  This variation is then amplified from a national perspective of hundreds of 
such organizations. It seems implausible these organizations would follow one model for 
governance, and that its impacts are uniform. Demonstrating this variation is a preliminary step 
                                                 
1 http://rigos.pitt.edu/data-resources 
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to understanding the impacts these organizations can have on both a region’s growth and its 
equity among local governments. 
With this background, I provide here some nominal definitions of the concepts explored 
throughout the dissertation2. Members are defined as the local governments (counties, 
municipalities, and townships) entitled to voting privileges in any chamber under the provisions 
of the governance documents3. Representatives are the elected officials, professional staff, 
locally appointed citizens, or others seated and voting on behalf of their local government 
member in any chamber. Votes are the value of each representative in the collective decision-
making process provided by the governance documents in any chamber or under any set of rules. 
Representational rights are the aggregation of provisions for each local government member’s 
representatives and votes (within a chamber or in total). Collective choice arrangements are the 
aggregation of all member governments’ representational rights (within a chamber or in total).  
This is not to suggest that political structures and population are the only two reasons 
board structures vary, just that they explain a substantial portion of the variation. Some states’ 
legislation mandates the membership, representation and voting of RIGOs; this is still the result 
of negotiations and capable of evolving as the regions do, but involves different stakeholders 
than the local governments themselves. The portfolio of policies a RIGO undertakes and who is 
permitted or chooses to participate in decisions regarding those policies would be another factor 
                                                 
2 These definitions are explored more deeply in the literature in Chapter 2, and operationalized in Chapter 
3. 
3 Federal/State/Native American governments, special and school districts, civic and private sector 
organizations and at-large citizens may be entitled to voting privileges within a RIGO but fall out of the purview of 
this research. For more information see Dougherty & Miller in Miller, Nelles, Dougherty, & Rickabaugh (2018).  
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that would likely affect the way governance is structured. Furthermore, we know that the 
region’s history, culture, and the worldview of the actors present affects how these negotiations 
may occur (Skuzinski, 2015).  This introductory chapter introduces readers to the concept of 
RIGOs, the importance of the “one-member, one-vote” question, and the ways in which it will be 
explored in the later chapters of the dissertation.   
1.1 What is a RIGO? 
Regional Intergovernmental Organizations (RIGOs) are one class of a larger typology of 
cross-boundary intergovernmental organizations that meet five distinct criteria that help 
researchers organize the dynamic and diverse world of regional governance. Miller and Nelles 
(2018) distinguish RIGOs from other organizations by identifying bodies that have: (1) general-
purpose local governments (GPLGs) as the majority of their members, (2) a broad policy agenda, 
(3) the ambition to be the organizational voice of local government for the region, (4) legitimacy 
granted by federal and state agencies, and (5) the broadest geographic scope of any organization 
within the geographic footprint. As a result of these criteria, the cross-boundary 
intergovernmental organizations identified as RIGOs are the single organization in its region that 
is the most representative, most robust and most nimble. RIGOs include many members of both 
the National Association of Regional Councils (NARC) and the National Association of 
Development Organizations (NADO). In some cases, these are state-designated bodies; 
Kentucky's Area Development Districts and Virginia's Planning District Commissions are two 
such examples. In other cases, RIGOs are more self-organized as the result of enabling 
legislation, incentives, and/or conditions of federal and state funding; organizations founded as 
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Metropolitan Planning Organizations (MPOs) and Economic Development Districts (EDDs) also 
have expanded their mission over time as regional needs have evolved. 
In a neoliberal economic environment for local governments and regions, RIGOs are one 
forum in which “growth machine” coalitions (Logan & Molotch, 2007) can manifest.  Pro-
development interest groups have the upper hand in local politics because they receive 
concentrated benefits and are better organized than diffuse public interest (Lubell, Feiock, & 
Ramirez De La Cruz, 2009). In federally-designated forums like MPOs and EDDs with a focus 
on development and public infrastructure, where local governments retain the bulk of board 
membership, it follows that these growth-focused decision-making patterns could continue. In 
many cases, RIGOs also provide voting or non-voting membership to chambers of commerce or 
other private sector interests (Dougherty & Miller in Miller & Nelles, 2018). But, this 
relationship between local governments and business interests was present before the formation 
of RIGOs, as well. 
The initial decline of center city business districts in the Northeast and Rust Belt in the 
early 20th century brought together local elected officials and private sector interests as 
residential and retail decentralization to the suburbs reduced city tax bases (Teaford, 1990). 
These concerns led a few cities to the first failed efforts to create a more “logical” metropolitan 
government (Glass, 2011; Teaford, 2016).  These coalitions supported initiatives such as 
improving highway access to downtowns that often had the unintended consequence of 
accelerating decentralization and expanding blight in major center cities (DiMento & Ellis, 
2013). In many regions, this geographic diffusion of both residential population and employment 
centers meant an increase in municipal incorporations and suburban infrastructure needs often 
spanning into new counties (and occasionally, across state lines) that reified inequities between 
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the city and suburbs, but also created and reinforced inequities amongst the suburbs themselves 
(Hanlon, Vicino, & Short, 2006; Schafran, 2013; Teaford, 2008). As this decentralization 
occurred, municipal chambers of commerce evolved from only advocating locally to becoming 
nested within a more regional or metropolitan perspective. These nested relationships may be 
competitive or acrimonious, nevertheless they collectively recognize some benefits to the 
economies of scale from coordination at this scale.  
In the 1950s and 1960s, many local governments also began to organize and coordinate at 
regional levels, creating what we know today as RIGOs. Most often these organizations are a 
voluntary association of local governments dedicated to planning and economic development, 
rather than metropolitan government. In some cases, this was the result of prescriptive state 
legislation or gubernatorial executive orders that drew the boundaries and specified their 
functions (and may or may not have prescribed collective choice arrangements). In other cases, 
the state enacted enabling legislation. Then, in response to state or federal incentives, local 
governments formed organizations through self-created arrangements (see Miller in Miller, 
Nelles, Dougherty & Rickabaugh [2018] for a deeper discussion of clustered vs. coordinated 
states). The federal government and states often use RIGOs as a central point to house, 
coordinate, or function as the federally recognized Economic Development Districts, Workforce 
Investment Boards, Metropolitan or Rural Transportation Planning Organizations, and a wide 
variety of state functions. This gives the local government members distinct policy levers to 
affect a region’s economic competitiveness and support business interests, but still retains the 
autonomy of local governments (Pincetl, 1994) and provides some administrative coordination 
for higher levels of government. Some normative scholarship has suggested that these regional 
organizations need more authority to overcome the drawbacks of fragmentation and competition 
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among local governments within the region (Orfield & Dawes, 2016; Orfield & Luce, 2012). I 
discuss the distinctions between statutory authority and collective choice arrangements in 
Chapter 2 and return to the normative scholarship on the statutory authority of RIGOs in Chapter 
6. For this dissertation, I focus on the empirics of collective choice arrangements as a component 
of how decisions are made, not what decisions can be made.  
In many cases, RIGOs also function as a substate district for administrative ease and 
efficiency to tackle issues of equity and quality of life for vulnerable populations, in ways 
entirely distinct from its agenda for economic development and infrastructure planning. RIGOs 
are often the federally-designated Area Agency on Aging that provides social services to senior 
citizens or coordinate services for area veterans through their local VA hospital. Some RIGOs 
have started addressing food deserts and homelessness. RIGOs may also be mandated by the 
federal government or their respective state to improve air and water quality within their region; 
other RIGOs have tackled climate resilience planning4. Many of these functions were not the 
primary or original purpose of the formation of the RIGO. More research is needed to determine 
which of these initiatives were directed by the local government members, the civic or private 
sector, or grafted on to the mission by higher levels of government.   
RIGOs occupy a unique space in the American governance landscape. RIGOs may 
function partly as administrative arms of their respective states and meet federal requirements for 
certain program designations, but must still remain responsive to the initiatives of their local 
government board members. RIGOs are a key stakeholder on decisions that affect the region’s 
                                                 
4 These efforts may or may not correspond to the “greening of the growth machine” (While, Jonas, & 
Gibbs, 2004), but are classified here to reflect that they are, at minimum, not traditional growth machine agenda 
items. 
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business sector while also crucial to the welfare of some vulnerable populations and the 
protection of natural resources. The RIGO is both charged with thinking holistically about the 
region, but still faces internal competition among local governments for economic advantages. 
Conceptualizing and measuring the collective choice arrangements is a necessary step to 
understanding these regional-local dynamics and the decisions RIGOs make on these issues.  
RIGOs, as a class of cross-boundary intergovernmental organizations, provide a useful 
population to then empirically evaluate the structure of collective choice arrangements of 
general-purpose local governments. RIGOs are ubiquitous throughout the United States and 
cover urban, suburban, and rural areas to varying degrees within each. Figure 1 shows their 
presence throughout the United States. 
RIGOs were formed both by state mandate and through local initiative. The regions 
themselves have changed demographically, politically, and culturally over time. Given all of this 
variation on the components of a region, it seems implausible RIGOs would rely so heavily on 
one model for governance. 
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Figure 1 Map of United States Showing RIGOs, RMPOs, and UROs5 
 
1.2 The One-Member, One-Vote Conventional Wisdom 
The scholarship on the governance of cross-boundary intergovernmental organizations 
like RIGOs has frequently mischaracterized the ways in which they structure their collective 
choice arrangements. These misinterpretations seem to result from strong concerns about the 
lack of population proportionality affecting center cities, a lack of clear definition in what 
constitutes a “member”, and methodological flaws in gathering the information about how these 
                                                 
5 Map by Jen Nelles, from www.rigos.pitt.edu. Honolulu County (HI, not pictured) currently is classified as 
an RMPO. The remainder of Hawai’i is unattached. 
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boards are structured. As a result, this idea of a “one-member, one-vote” board structure has 
perpetuated itself. These ideas will be expanded on in Chapter 2; however, I include a brief 
overview here because of its centrality to the thesis of the dissertation. 
1.2.1  Differing Normative Views on RIGOs 
In light of failed attempts to bring about metropolitan government and the focus on the 
impacts of suburbanization on center cities, much of the literature evaluating intergovernmental 
cross-boundary organizations focuses on urban governments. This framing compares these 
organizations to governments; in this case, local governments that rely on a one-person, one-vote 
representation model. Further, the existing frame presents the argument as a city-suburb or city-
country dichotomy that has its own pitfalls and normative implications that implies rural 
economies lack industry or urban areas lack natural resources worthy of protection (Wachsmuth, 
2013). The normative arguments about how these organizations ought to structure their 
representation may still have merit and value; however, they are premised on flawed 
conventional wisdom. This dissertation presents a more complete empirical picture of collective 
choice arrangements to better inform this discussion.  
Two metropolitan areas have dominated the discussion on regional government and 
governance: Portland (OR) and Minneapolis-St. Paul (MN), often dismissing the hundreds of 
regional efforts present throughout the rest of the country (Katz, 2000; Orfield & Dawes, 2016; 
Rusk, 2013). In a continuum of regional organizations from purely private sector (like a 
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metropolitan chamber of commerce) to purely public sector6, most would consider these two 
organizations the most purely public sector. These two institutions seat representatives from 
equal-population districts that cut across municipal boundaries7, which are fundamentally 
different collective choice arrangements than associations of local governments like RIGOs. 
These are certainly innovative, unique organizations; the studies of the outcomes on their regions 
have been identified (Orfield & Luce, 2012). However because of their implementation, 
disaggregating the impact of the governance of Portland Metro and Twin Cities’ Met Council 
from the impact of the broader statutory authority of these organizations is impossible. Whether 
regions across the United States ought to adopt this model is a normative question; further 
evaluation of these two organizations does not help answer the empirical questions about how 
the remaining regions operate.  
Unlike Metro and Met Council, RIGOs (and most other cross-boundary 
intergovernmental organizations) are membership organizations. The prior empirical research 
determined that the dominant form is “one-member, one-vote”, leaving center cities under-
represented relative to their population (Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, 
1973; Benjamin et al., 1994; Kramer & Bond, 2010; Hall, 2009; Teitz & Barbour, 2007; 
Wikstrom, 1977; Wyman, 1994). If it can be demonstrated that there is substantial variation in 
the representational rights of local governments, normative and empirical scholarship must 
account for this diversity in how we understand the policy areas RIGOs choose to undertake and 
                                                 
6 Certainly there are examples of institutions where the civic sector takes the lead on regional governance 
initiatives. One such present-day example would be the West Central Initiative based in Fergus Falls, Minnesota.  
7 Portland Metro does this by election; Twin Cities’ Met Council does this by appointment of the 
Minnesota Governor. 
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their effectiveness in doing so. This variation is also a key to disaggregating the effects of 
governance and statutory authority on regional outcomes that we cannot currently do with Metro 
and Met Council.  
RIGOs often function across sectors, leading to an entirely different normative 
perspective of how they should operate. By definition, RIGOs must be constituted by a majority 
of general-purpose local governments. However, one key distinction often ignored by the 
literature is that representation in a RIGO is not limited to local governments, moving these 
organizations away from the terminus on a public-private sector spectrum. These bodies may 
include representatives from business interests, minority communities, and major non-profit 
institutions like universities or foundations. As a result, RIGOs operate a more multi-sectoral 
network of governance than Metro and Met Council. This model of collaboration aligns more 
closely with an entirely different (though not necessarily contradictory) strain of normative 
scholarship on how local governments ought to function in modern society as part of a regional, 
multi-sectoral network (Goldsmith & Eggers, 2004; Innes, Booher, & Di Vittorio, 2010). The 
research on the role of civic and private sector stakeholders on RIGO boards is promising, but in 
its early stages (Dougherty & Miller in Miller & Nelles, 2018). This dissertation is limited to the 
representational rights of local governments, but acknowledges that additional research into civic 
and private sector actors on RIGO boards adds crucial context to an understanding of collective 
choice arrangements.  
1.2.2  Using International Organizations Literature to Improve Empirical Methods 
Neither of these normative views is sufficient for understanding the empirics of RIGO 
governance, so a new analytical lens is needed. Rather than compare RIGOs to government, I 
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propose comparing RIGOs to International Organizations (IOs) like the European Union or UN 
Security Council. A limited set of literature has hinted at these ideas (Ensch, 2008; Frug & 
Barron, 2013); I make these ties both explicit and empirical. Like RIGOs, International 
Organizations are also often voluntary membership organizations with a focus on economic 
growth (usually through trade or security). In both RIGOs and IOs, the collective members 
represent a principal in a principal-agent relationship to the organization’s staff that then 
implements the board’s will; this is in contrast to interlocal agreements or treaties that are 
enforced by the members themselves (Feiock, 2009). Municipalities may sign interlocal 
agreements to allow their citizens to borrow from either library, but this is distinct from an 
interlocal agreement creating a joint library board to which the library staff reports. Similarly, 
nations may sign bi-lateral or multi-lateral treaties on trade, but these treaties would be distinct 
from forming (or joining) an independently-staffed international organization like the World 
Trade Organization. This principal-agent relationship is a crucial distinction from internally 
administered agreements because this staff is now responsible to the collective whole. Both 
organizations also require that smaller players retain a sufficient enough collective veto such that 
the decisions reflect the region, rather than just the dominant players (Kirsch &  Langner, 2011; 
Taagepera & Hosli, 2006).  
Rather than only focusing on the under-representation of center cities, IO  scholarship 
analyzes all members as equal units of analysis. This allows for a view of regional collective 
choice arrangements that is blind to a local government’s status as a center city, edge city 
(Garreau, 1992), first-ring suburb, exurb, or the other classifications of urban form. This 
approach recognizes both the economic power and centrality of the larger cities and that the 
smaller and interstitial spaces often identify more regionally than their more urban counterparts 
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(Young & Keil, 2014). IO scholars spend relatively little time worrying about the under-
representation of Germany in the EU proportional to its population and economic power. This 
scholarship also recognizes the importance of the autonomy of smaller states in the EU to the 
sustainability of the organization (Taagepera & Hosli, 2006). Using this more member-neutral, 
empirical framework does not reify the city-country dichotomy (Wachsmuth, 2013) and does not 
classify suburbs as a homogeneous group (Hanlon et al., 2006; Teaford, 2008). I return to the 
under-representation of large cities to contrast my empirical findings with the prior conceptions 
of them to show how the results differ with a new lens. 
1.2.3  Definitional and Methodological Limitations in Prior Research 
The research that underlies the “one-member, one-vote” conventional wisdom in cross-
boundary intergovernmental organizations has three substantial limitations. First, using a survey 
question or imputing governance from a roster is a shallow proxy for identifying how 
governance actually occurs. Second, the conceptualization of membership in prior research is 
particularly problematic given the nested nature of municipalities and counties in most American 
states. Third, a “one-member, one-vote” model is not necessarily mutually exclusive with 
population proportionality. My methods for remedying these limitations are briefly outlined at 
the end of this section, but are expanded upon in Chapter 3. 
The initial research on board structures used surveys and imputed from rosters, but using 
these methods lacks nuance. Surveys used by Wyman (1994) and ACIR (1973) gave a very 
limited set of nominal characteristics for executive directors to describe their board structures. 
The ACIR gave regional council directors four options to describe their boards: equal (“one-
member, one-vote”), proportionate population, combination, or other and give this option for 
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both their general assembly and their executive committee (Advisory Commission on 
Intergovernmental Relations, 1973, pg. 82). In 1994, MPOs were assessed by surveys with a 
specific focus on the representation of center cities relative to their population (Benjamin et al., 
1994). More granular information was sought out in some cases limiting the population of MPOs 
to a particular state or the largest regions by population (Lewis & Sprague, 1997; Sanchez, 
2006). However, there is no complete registry for the voting structures of MPOs (along with 
RIGOs and other cross-boundary intergovernmental organizations) (Nelson, Sanchez, Wolf, & 
Farquhar, 2003).  
Second, knowing if a RIGO (or other cross-boundary intergovernmental organization) 
provides equal or proportional voting to members is only useful when we know how membership 
is operationalized. Most states’ municipalities are nested within counties, thus membership can 
be more complicated than in international organizations like the UN or EU. When a RIGO only 
provides membership to the counties (as in the Southeastern Wisconsin Regional Planning 
Commission), it becomes much more challenging to disaggregate the representation of a center 
city on the board. In some cases (as under Indiana state law), RIGOs may provide membership to 
some municipalities in their region, but not all. RIGOs may also create multi-jurisdictional 
memberships to create population balances, as is the case for two counties in the St. Louis RIGO 
(East-West Gateway Council of Governments) that share one vote. “One member, one vote” is 
meaningful only when we know the units of membership are consistent both within and across 
organizations. My research shows that the empirical reality is far more complicated than this. 
Third, to say an organization has a “one-member, one-vote” model does not 
automatically equate to a population disproportional result. In its simplest form, a four-county 
RIGO where each county has 50,000 residents can develop a “one-member, one-vote” structure 
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that is entirely population proportional. The above examples show how multi-jurisdictional 
members and the selective inclusion of municipalities can lead to more population proportional 
governance models that retain equal votes among its members (however they have chosen to 
define membership). 
I remedy many of these methodological shortcomings by using the current governance 
documents of the RIGOs, treating the member as the unit of analysis, and generating a random 
national sample. By using the charters, bylaws, joint powers agreements, state statutes and other 
relevant original documentation of the RIGO, I am coding the most granular and valid 
information possible. Rather than categorizing the RIGO under broad umbrella terms like 
“population proportional” or “one-member, one-vote”, I code each member individually as 
defined within those original governance documents and aggregate those findings using cluster 
analysis to compare across RIGOs. Finally, by generating a random national sample, I collect 
information that more accurately represents the entire landscape of RIGOs rather than a focus on 
just those with major cities.  
1.3 Structure of the Dissertation 
The dissertation is presented in six chapters. In Chapter 2, I argue that the international 
organizations literature provides a compelling perspective that can assist scholars of RIGOs and 
other cross-boundary intergovernmental organizations in more rigorous modeling of governance 
and introducing new research questions to better understand these institutions’ functions. While 
some literature has evaluated how cross-boundary intergovernmental organizations govern 
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themselves it has largely focused on the under-representation of the center city, rather than a 
more holistic view of the organization.  
The third chapter outlines my methods for evaluating the membership, representation, 
and voting of local governments on RIGO boards. In this chapter, I introduce a typology of 
membership that accounts for the nested nature of municipalities within counties. I also describe 
the random sampling method and coding scheme used to differentiate who is permitted to 
represent local governments on RIGO boards (elected officials, appointed officials, citizens, 
etc.). These coding schemes are used consistently throughout Chapters 4 and 5. 
In Chapter 4, I present the quantitative findings of my research.  Here I introduce the key 
contributions of my dissertation: a measurement for the amount of seats allocated based on 
institutional membership (how close a RIGO is to “one-member, one-vote”) and modify an 
existing formula to reflect population proportionality, and demonstrate their value together. The 
substantial variation in RIGO governance is demonstrated by a scatterplot that contrasts the 
institutional membership and population proportionality across the entire random sample. This 
scatterplot is then compared only to the RIGOs in the random sample with large cities 
(population greater than 200,000). Relatively few RIGOs with large cities in the random sample 
have a high institutional membership score and a low population proportionality score; this is an 
important indicator that much of the concern of under-representation of large cities in RIGOs has 
been over-stated. Finally, I conclude with some key findings about who is permitted to represent 
local governments on the boards of RIGOs. Unlike theories of administrative conjunction 
(Frederickson, 1999), RIGO boards rely on a local government’s elected officials (not appointed) 
to work collaboratively.  Little has been studied empirically as to how local elected officials 
work cross-boundary in an American context, especially when compared to the appointed staff. 
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I present two profiles of different RIGOs in Chapter 5. Both of these profiles use the 
methods from Chapters 3 & 4 to measure institutional membership and population 
proportionality in RIGO collective choice arrangements in different ways. In developing these 
profiles, I rely on original documentation provided by the RIGO, news reports, selected relevant 
academic articles, and select interviews. Chapter 5 applies these methods to a set of proposals 
presented to the board when the Southcentral Michigan Planning Council re-started its 
organization in 2012 and measure an organization’s collective choice arrangements over time, 
using the Sacramento Area Council of Governments as an example. The Sacramento region saw 
a rapid expansion of population from 1960-2010 that was unevenly felt throughout the region 
leading to shifting disparities. Substantial municipal incorporations occurred during that period 
as well, creating new local government members to incorporate in collective choice 
arrangements. 
In Chapter 6, I conclude with the policy implications of my research. I focus this section 
on the ways my findings can be applied by practitioners. I also discuss a future research agenda 
that can identify underlying factors in how RIGOs balance institutional membership and 
population proportionality and how this balance may impact policy outcomes within and across 
regions.  I also seek to move beyond the governance documents and evaluate how decisions are 
made within RIGOs across three highly interrelated facets: informal governance, the motivations 
and perceptions of board members, and the principal-agent dynamic between the board and 
RIGO staff. I also return to the normative scholarship on how regions ought to govern 
themselves and discuss the ramifications of these findings in that light.  
By integrating the literature on international organizations, my research reframes much of 
the conventional wisdom about organizations like RIGOs. The conceptualizing and modeling 
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they use to understand how governments cooperate sheds new light on RIGOs in a larger 
perspective than simply another form of interlocal activity. Rather than prior research’s reliance 
on survey data, coding the existing governance documents gives a much richer view of the ways 
local governments share decision-making authority. These documents show striking this balance 
between the variety of local governments requires innovation, evolution, and diplomacy. The 
implications of these findings are substantial for both academics and practitioners. 
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2.0 Literature Review 
In this chapter, I begin by summarizing the existing scholarship on governance of cross-
boundary intergovernmental organizations and identify several conceptual and methodological 
gaps. To help address these gaps, I introduce and justify importing elements of the international 
organizations methodological framework and research agenda onto RIGOs. I then examine the 
limitations of the international organization approach. Finally, I explore the ways in which new 
regionalist scholarship and international organizations view the role of “great powers” within 
these bodies.  
2.1 Existing Scholarship on the Governance of Cross-Boundary Intergovernmental Organizations 
Very little empirical research has been done that has evaluated the representational rights 
of local governments within cross-boundary intergovernmental organizations. Much of what has 
been done nationally has been part of broader evaluations of the entire scope of the functions and 
governance of Councils of Governments (Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, 
1973; Bryan & Wolf, 2009; Dodge, 1996; Mogulof, 1971; Wikstrom, 1977; Wyman, 1994) or by 
selecting a population based on specific components like Metropolitan Planning Organizations 
(Barbour, 2015; Ensch, 2008; FCRC Consensus Center, 2012; McDowell, 1995; Nelson, 
Sanchez, Wolf, & Farquhar, 2003; Sanchez, 2006). As a result, much of what we know 
nationally about the collective choice arrangements of these organizations is quite superficial. 
Much of the research that has evaluated the governance of COGs and MPOs with depth has been 
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limited to case studies (Lindstrom, 2010; Luna, 2015; Visser, 2004) or to a restricted sample 
based on state criteria (J. L. Hall, 2008; Kwon & Park, 2014; Lewis & Sprague, 1997). As a 
result, highly simplistic nominal survey results of collective choice arrangements often have 
substituted for a more refined understanding of these complex structures. These rather blunt 
survey results are the genesis of the “one-member, one-vote” refrain common throughout the 
discussion of COGs and MPOs.  
Despite the limited empirical evidence supporting it, scholarship cites the “one-member, 
one-vote” governance structure as a cause for the perceived weakness of COGs and MPOs. 
Orfield and Dawes (2016) describe the current collective choice arrangements of MPOs as 
undemocratic: “The general lack of representational voting within MPO governing boards also 
undermines effective regional governance because non-democratic governance structures tend to 
produce outcomes that go against the interests of underrepresented parties” (pg. 11).  
Zimmerman identifies the one-member, one-vote model as benefitting suburbs, while a one-
person, one-vote model favors cities (Zimmermann, 2011). COGs and MPOs are often 
contrasted with Met Council in the Twin Cities and Portland Metro (OR) that both use districts 
that cut across municipal and county boundaries to identify representatives to purportedly 
generate more equitable growth and development (Orfield & Luce, 2012; Rusk, 2013). What has 
not yet been parsed in the Met Council and Portland Metro hagiographies is the impact of the 
collective choice arrangements compared to these organizations’ more robust statutory authority. 
Were an organization like the Greater Vancouver Regional District to emerge in the United 
States that provides representation based on local government boundaries and with substantial 
powers (Wolman, 2017), we could begin to disaggregate the impact of each of these factors 
individually.  
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Simultaneously to the above developments, scholarship in the public administration field 
has put an overt focus on how professional staff perceives collaboration across boundaries, with 
little understanding of how elected officials operate in these organizations. Much of the recent 
scholarship has been built from Frederickon’s (1999) “administrative conjunction.” In the twenty 
years since, scholars have built a solid body of knowledge about the networks of interlocal 
agreements (usually negotiated by professional staff), sometimes using participation in a cross-
boundary intergovernmental organization as an independent variable to predict the prevalence of 
this more ad hoc form of cooperation (Aldag & Warner, 2017; Carr, LeRoux, & Shrestha, 2009; 
LeRoux, Brandenburger, & Pandey, 2010; Thurmaier & Wood, 2002).  Relatively little 
scholarship has examined the role of elected officials on the boards of cross-boundary 
intergovernmental organizations and how they receive input, make decisions and collaborate as 
board members. What has been done has tied the relative presence of elected officials compared 
to professional staff regarding transportation outcomes (Gerber & Gibson, 2009).  
The methods used thus far to empirically investigate collective choice arrangements in 
cross-boundary intergovernmental organizations can be improved substantially. Our initial 
understanding of collective choice arrangements were based on surveys of regional council 
executive directors (Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, 1973; Wyman, 
1994). These surveys gave respondents four options to describe the structure of their boards: 
one-member, one-vote, one-person, one-vote, hybrid, or other. These were efficient, reasonable 
approaches to gathering this data at the time. In 2003, scholars identified a need for more 
granular information:  
 
“… it was found that voting structure is not disclosed through popular 
mechanisms such as the Internet, through MPO publications, or in any federal 
compendium. Although some MPO websites have this information and some 
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provide it through a variety of printed media, for others this basic piece of 
information is simply not accessible remotely, including by personal contact (e.g., 
e-mail and letter).” (page 4) (Nelson et al., 2003) 
 
In the fifteen years since this was written, governments have substantially expanded the 
information available from the internet. This has extended to RIGOs and other cross-boundary 
intergovernmental organizations. While not every RIGO publicly posts by-laws or other 
governance documents, they are now substantially more accessible online than they were in 2003 
and technology has allowed RIGO professional staff to send documents more easily.  
With more granular information available in bylaws, charters, joint powers agreements, 
and other governing documents, operationalizing can become more sophisticated than a four-
category, nominal survey result. These governing documents outline which local governments 
(counties, municipalities, townships) are entitled to representational rights. While the initial 
survey recognized the potential for different representational rights across multiple chambers 
(Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, 1973), more complete documentation 
allows for direct comparisons across those chambers.  This information also now allows for 
those local government members to be the units of analysis based on the number of 
representatives to which they are permitted. This information can then be compared to their 
populations to identify the extent of population (dis-) proportionality. Aggregation of this data 
can provide a much more refined picture of the collective choice arrangements of RIGOs. The 
Miller, Nelles, Dougherty, & Rickabaugh (2018) national database of RIGOs allows for a 
consistent, operationalized population from which a random sample can be drawn to gather this 
information and create generalizable findings.  
These governance documents further identify who is permitted to represent a member 
local government (citizen, elected official, professional staff); this presents a wealth of 
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opportunities to eventually test a variety of conflicting and under-developed research. The prior 
lack of a compendium of governance documentation limits our ability to know what general 
trends in representation might exist on RIGO boards, but previous scholarship has indicated the 
distinction between elected officials and professional staff is important. In contrast to Gerber & 
Gibson (2009), a survey involving a hypothetical regional governance initiative determined a 
higher level for support from elected officials than appointed officials (Matkin & Frederickson, 
2009). However our understanding of the network of elected officials is still quite limited 
(Feiock, Lee, Park, & Lee, 2010), and even less is known about the ways in which they make 
decisions. 
There are a variety of frameworks for regional governance (Feiock, 2009; Foster & 
Barnes, 2011) and calls for expanded empirical research (Basolo, 2003; Bryan & Wolf, 2009; 
Miller, Nelles, Dougherty, & Rickabaugh, 2018). A large-scale effort to collect governance 
documents ameliorates some of these concerns. But, how to code and analyze these documents 
requires grounding in comparable literature. In the following section, I justify why a research 
agenda and methods selectively imported from the international organizations literature can 
provide a valuable source of scholarship to support this work. 
2.2 Introducing the International Organizations Literature to RIGOs 
Albeit at different scales, the fundamentals of the two classes of organizations mirror one 
another. The Union of International Associations has a simple definition for their members: “(a) 
being based on a formal instrument of agreement between the governments of states; (b) 
including three or more states as parties to the agreement; and (c) possessing a permanent 
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secretariat performing ongoing tasks” (Dijkzeul & Beigbeder, 2003, pg. 3). RIGOs meet this 
same definition when scaled down to the American regional level. They were founded through 
joint powers agreements, charters or other founding documents, include three or more local 
governments, and retain permanent staff to oversee the regular operations under the guidance of 
the members of the organization.   
Cross-boundary organizations in the United States (like RIGOs) and international 
organizations occupy reasonably similar spaces on spectrums that compare intergovernmental 
cooperation and competition. Participation in a RIGO (or IO) is an act of cooperation, but one 
that has relatively few limits on a local government’s autonomy while retaining the opportunities 
for gains from collaborating across boundaries. Whether this is optimal for public choice 
scholars or advocates of regional government is a separate question. Likewise in the international 
sphere, realist scholarship perceives the interactions of states as anarchical and highly 
competitive (Waltz, 2001). Nevertheless, nations seek gains from cooperation in ways that 
respect sovereignty through international organizations. And while world government is 
exponentially less likely to occur than a universe of American metropolitan governments, they 
both represent useful termini of an institution that allows for maximal cooperation and minimal 
autonomy.   
Both international organizations and RIGOs are subject to criticism from normative 
scholarship and political forces tugging at them from both ends of these spectrums. New 
regionalist scholars have derided organizations like RIGOs for focusing on only the lowest 
common denominator problems (J. S. Hall, 2009; Orfield & Dawes, 2016), while facing political 
criticism from American conservatives that they are subverting local autonomy (Idahoans 
Against Agenda 21, 2015). Glass (2018) summarizes these arguments as having “settled into a 
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stale détente despite the continuing significance of city-regions to economic growth” (pg. 1). 
Similarly, international organizations face criticisms from normative constructivist scholars who 
suggest these organizations are not empowered enough to tackle the true challenges they are 
designed to address. Koremenos, Lipson, & Snidal (2001) explain, that for good or for bad, “… 
states use international institutions to further their own goals, and they design institutions 
accordingly” (page 762). Meanwhile, efforts like Brexit and the rise of nationalist parties on 
continental Europe are, in part, a response to a perceived over-reach of the European Union. 
Throughout these comparisons, I use language that can be consistently applied to both 
international organizations (IO) and RIGOs. My use of the term members refers to the 
governments themselves that are party to the agreement; IO literature refers to these as member 
states and within RIGOs these are restricted to local governments. Representatives are the 
“accredited delegates of their governments, who have the prime responsibility in the decision-
making process” (Jordan, et al., 2001, pg. 211). However, these representatives need not be 
elected officials; representatives may be citizens appointed by elected officials to represent the 
government as a whole. Additionally, in both RIGOs and IOs, “a government may use 
representatives of private interest groups or [business interests] as participants at various levels 
in the [organizational] decision-making process” (Jordan et al., 2001, pg. 211). In order to 
comply with EDA regulations, many RIGOs must include in the decision-making process 
“private sector, public officials, community leaders, representatives of workforce development 
boards, institutions of higher education, minority and labor groups, and private individuals” (13 
CFR Ch. III (1-1-16 Edition, §304.2(c)(2))). 
Within the governing documents, members are provided representational rights. I use this 
term to encompass provisions in the document that enable, provide or restrict each member 
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within the decision-making process. This would include, but is not limited to: specifying 
representation in various chambers and committees, provisions under alternate voting rules, and 
constraints on who may serve as a representative. The members’ aggregated representational 
rights under the governing documents are described here as collective choice arrangements 
(Crawford & Ostrom, 2005; Ostrom, 1990).  
Certainly there is variation in the scope of responsibilities and the collective choice 
arrangements amongst and between RIGOs and international organizations, but they have had 
minimal cross-pollination in scholarly activity. Frug & Barron (2013) propose a hypothetical 
“regional legislature” that would replace organizations like RIGOs loosely based around 
representational principles of the European Union with increased statutory authority. Ensch 
(2008) applied formal models developed for understanding representation in international 
organizations research to Metropolitan Planning Organizations. However, beyond this, the 
crossover applications are scant. From the American domestic perspective, some of this is 
explained by the intense focus of late on the networks of bilateral, internally administered, 
interlocal agreements rather than on the institutions formed by multilateral, delegated, mutually 
binding agreements (Feiock, 2009). Only recently has there been renewed interest in “real 
existing regionalism,” of which RIGOs are certainly one facet (Addie & Keil, 2015; Schafran, 
2014). Meanwhile, the international organizations scholarship has blossomed, in part, due to a 
more limited number of potential players and a smaller population of organizations that allows 
for a more in-depth analysis. As a result, the international organizations literature has far 
outpaced the American domestic literature.  Our understanding of RIGOs (and other cross-
boundary intergovernmental organizations) can be greatly enhanced by learning from our 
counterparts studying international organizations, in both theory and method. 
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This dissertation focuses on demonstrating that there is variation in the collective choice 
arrangements of RIGOs, however, this is often implicitly conflated with the authority of a RIGO 
(see Hall [2009] quote on Page 4 and also Mogulof, 1971; Orfield & Luce, 2012; Wikstrom, 
1977). In international organizations literature, the two concepts are distinct but have an 
acknowledged relationship (Posner & Sykes, 2014). Much of the research that has lauded the 
Twin Cities Met Council and Portland Metro has credited their success to both their population 
proportional districts and their statutory authority that far exceeds what RIGOs are enabled to 
undertake (Frug & Barron, 2013; Katz, 2000; Orfield, 1997; Orfield & Luce, 2012; Rusk, 2013). 
What has yet to be demonstrated is which of the three elements that separate these two 
organizations from RIGOs (districts that cut across local government boundaries, population 
proportionality, and expanded statutory authority) are necessary and which are sufficient to see 
the outcomes these scholars value. My research develops new evidence that can be examined in 
this debate, particularly regarding the potential importance of population proportionality and 
local government membership. Much like in international organizations, the statutory authority 
of a RIGO can be parsed from its collective choice arrangements. 
The remaining components of this section demonstrate the similarities between RIGOs 
and international organizations in purpose, and in institutional structure.  I then explore how 
other elements of the international organizations literature can be imported to build out our 
understanding of the collective choice arrangements and the broader institutional components of 
RIGOs. I conclude by discussing some of the limitations and modifications necessary to 
effectively account for the differences between RIGOs and international organizations. 
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2.2.1  The Economic Benefits of Intergovernmental Cooperation 
Be they municipal, county, state, or national borders, one of the key factors in favor of 
intergovernmental cooperation are the economic benefits.  This was identified but not explored 
more deeply by Gerber and Gibson (2009): “Many regional governance arrangements are 
organized with the explicit goal of enhancing economic efficiency in public policy and service 
delivery across a region” (pg. 634) and in the subsequent footnote: “Discussions of regionalism 
parallel scholarship on globalization, which points to the collective benefits of authority 
migration away from the nation-state and toward supranational institutions” (pg. 634). Economic 
benefits are the genesis of organizations like the World Trade Organization, the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations, and the attempts at metropolitan government outlined in Chapter 1. In a 
neoliberal economic system, competition heavily incentivizes taking advantage of these benefits, 
so as not to be left behind. Both RIGOs and international organizations see many of the same 
categories of benefits from their efforts. In this section, I briefly outline two broad categories of 
such benefits: economic security and competitiveness, and the coordination across borders. 
These benefits often are the same impetus for internally-administered, bilateral policy networks 
(Feiock, 2009), but I demonstrate in this section the ways in which both local governments and 
national governments have delegated these functions to new institutions. Within each section, I 
identify the principles behind the accumulation of benefits and how these benefits manifest in the 
actions of example organizations.  
One of the main purposes of the formation of both RIGOs and international organizations 
is the gain of benefits from the economy of scale. Certain governmental functions with high 
overhead costs or functions undertaken with limited resources may be better accomplished 
(either at lower cost or at higher quality) through cooperation in burden-sharing (Aldag & 
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Warner, 2017; Dolan, 1990; Leroux & Carr, 2007; Morgan & Hirlinger, 1991). For example, 
rural municipal or county governments may not have the technical or financial capacity to 
implement broadband infrastructure in communities where the private market is unwilling to 
invest. By partnering and collaborating through a RIGO, this initiative can be accomplished 
more efficiently collectively than it could have been individually. United Nations peacekeeping 
missions would be a similar example on an international scale. Having an organization dedicated 
to providing this function means that smaller nations can contribute a small amount and receive 
substantially more in benefits (in security) than by doing so individually.  
Specialization within organizations also allows for gains in cooperation as well. Within 
the international sphere, this often takes the form of trade.  The European Union began as trading 
partners for coal and steel and evolved over time to encompass a wide variety of goods and 
services across an increasing number of trading partners. The interdependence across these 
countries generated benefits in security as well as economic growth. Within the American 
regional context, this specialization still occurs that creates interdependence, but at a different 
scale. Similar to diversification in industry, local governments also have adopted “a kind of  
‘competition in creativity’ … where consumers and producers alike are caught up in an almost 
compulsive obsession for that which is ‘new’” (Penrose & Pitelis, pg. 171). However, most local 
governments do not have the capacity to simultaneously pursue new jobs, new housing stock, 
new businesses, and other new community assets, thus they specialize their efforts. The 
typologies that classify suburbs as bedroom communities, centers of industry, or commercial 
suburbs are an indication that an awareness of this specialization is happening (Garreau, 1992; 
Hanlon, Vicino, & Short, 2006; Teaford, 2008). We do have some evidence this specialization 
occurs and its impacts on the region in the ways upmarket municipalities protect this status 
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within their region by denying affordable housing projects (Albright, Derickson, & Massey, 
2013; Freeman & Schuetz, 2016) and intra-metropolitan agglomeration economies (Waldfogel, 
2010). What has not yet been identified is if these different specialized types of urban forms seek 
different goals from a RIGO, and if so, how. Though, it seems highly plausible that a bedroom 
community would seek community development funding or human services initiatives more 
aggressively and a suburb focusing on industry or commerce may focus more on economic 
development assistance, but neither the results nor the processes underneath have been 
investigated. 
Certain governmental functions require capital costs that result in highly specific assets or 
involve tasks that are difficult to measure outcomes; these functions are more likely to be 
efficiently accomplished through cooperative activity (Brown & Potoski, 2003). The proposal to 
create permanent sites for the summer and winter Olympics rather than consistently re-investing 
in new infrastructure across the globe is an example of highly specific assets that can be more 
efficiently accomplished through collective activity than individually (Baade & Matheson, 
2016). Similarly, a metropolitan region’s investment of federal transportation monies in its 
airport or locks and dams are highly specific assets that have benefits for all members better 
achieved through cooperation. When governmental functions are difficult to measure or 
prescribe precise actions (such as international security missions or services for the elderly), 
benefits can accrue from collaboration by reducing transaction costs in the development and 
administration of services.  Furthermore, it can diffuse the risk of unanticipated costs of such 
activities over a larger pool of parties. 
Delegating to an external institution the coordination of activities across borders and the 
conservation of common pool resources also reduces transaction costs (E. Ostrom, 1990; V. 
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Ostrom, 2008; Williamson, 1981; O. R. Young, 1994).  Hawkins (2006) identifies this in the 
context of international organizations: “The greater the externalities, the more likely states are to 
engage in mutually coordinated action. The gains from cooperation, however, can also be 
enhanced by delegating to an agent” (pg. 15). International organizations like the European 
Union have created standards for the flow of citizens and goods across borders that have 
obviated the need for bilateral re-negotiations as markets or circumstances have shifted. In many 
ways, Brexit has highlighted the efficiency of the European Union system from a transaction-
cost perspective. International organizations like the International Seabed Authority are designed 
to ensure the sustainable exploration and extraction of minerals in international waters.  Similarly 
at the domestic regional scale, the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations 
identified both the need to coordinate activities across borders and conserve common pool 
resources at the time many RIGOs were being founded (Advisory Commission on 
Intergovernmental Relations, 1962). RIGOs maintain third party, technical staff that can evaluate 
the costs and benefits of a project beyond a municipal or county border to the region as a whole.  
Many Montana RIGOs act simultaneously as an Economic Development District and as a state 
conservation district. In more urban areas, many RIGOs pair their function as a Metropolitan 
Planning Organization with a federally-required Congestion Management and Air Quality 
program that ties its transportation investments to its impacts on health on quality of life. 
Both local and national governments cooperate and delegate to new institutions for many 
of the same reasons. Next, I turn to the similarities these organizations share in their institutional 
design.  
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2.2.2  Similarities in Institutional Design Between RIGOs & International Organizations 
Both RIGOs and International Organizations are primarily products of the twentieth 
century. Most efforts prior to World War II like the League of Nations or the efforts at two–
tiered metropolitan government were not ultimately successful in developing a sustainable 
institution. However, at both scales, the dynamic shifts in economics and security after the war 
created crises that accelerated the need for cooperative institutions. It was in this time period that 
coalitions of nations founded the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the United Nations, the 
World Trade Organization, among others to promote security and strong economies through 
interdependence. Soon thereafter at the domestic regional scale, suburbanization was spanning 
across county (and state) lines and the need for rural economic development in places like 
Appalachia and the Mountain West was growing. The federal and state governments recognized 
that municipalities and counties would require interdependence to overcome their challenges as 
well. However, building institutions to be sustainable representative voices of their members is 
rarely a one-size-fits-all approach.  While the international organizations literature recognizes a 
variety of approaches to building collective choice arrangements (Jordan et al., 2001; Posner & 
Sykes, 2014; Vestergaard & Wade, 2013), the prior American domestic regional literature has 
relied primarily on one or two nominal questions on a survey to make “one-member, one-vote” 
generalizations about the governance of cross-boundary intergovernmental organizations like 
RIGOs (Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, 1973; Wyman, 1994). This 
section further investigates the ways in which RIGOs and International Organizations share 
institutional design similarities. 
RIGOs have similar precipitating conditions that Keohane (1984) identified that gave rise 
to international organizations. Either by state mandate or by the wills of the local governments 
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themselves, a limited number of actors were identified. These actors have existing patterns of 
interactions that build confidence amongst one another. In an American domestic regional 
context, some of this confidence is reaffirmed by contract law and other state actions that can 
prevent reneging. These actors also share interests; the quality of a region’s workforce, 
transportation infrastructure, and economic development is outside the control of any one local 
government, but with impacts on all local governments. Those three policy areas in particularly 
are particularly issue dense, making cooperation more likely as well on related policies like 
congestion management and air quality, some kinds of housing policies, and community 
development. The academic discussion surrounding megaregions provides a good point of 
contrast here. Glass (2015) recognizes the difficulties in overcoming the sheer plethora of local 
governments in creating a Great Lakes megaregional governance organization; this runs counter 
to Keohane’s precondition of a limited number of actors. Whether there are sufficient existing 
patterns of interaction among those actors, their shared interests, or the necessary issue density to 
support a sustainable mega-regional organization has yet to be explored empirically with the 
actors themselves. 
Both RIGOs and international organizations have limits in their scope of activities that 
leave substantial autonomy or sovereignty to their members. The authority of the organizations is 
certainly a contributing factor to the ways in which collective choice arrangements are designed. 
While theory suggests that increasing the delegated authority of the institution leads to higher 
external costs from decisions against a member’s interests (Buchanan & Tullock, 1962), it is 
unclear how those effects are counterbalanced in collective choice arrangements by the reduced 
transaction costs and gains from economies of scale. Furthermore, these are not known objective 
values at the time of consent; the collective choice arrangements are the result of members’ 
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perceived costs and benefits projected in the future.  As a result, there is strong reason to believe 
the representational rights of the members of RIGOs and international organizations are 
influenced by the authority delegated to the organization, but that relationship remains unclear 
(Posner & Sykes, 2014). 
The international organizations literature recognizes that the collective choice 
arrangements are a balance of institutional membership and proportionality that evolve over 
time, while the scholarship on American cross-boundary intergovernmental organizations has yet 
to substantively recognize this. The Bretton Woods Agreement formed the International 
Monetary Fund’s collective choice arrangements as a balance between “a one-member, one-vote 
system and voting based purely on the size of each country’s economy” (Woodward, 2007, pg. 
1). The IMF’s “voice” reforms (2010) created a new balance that increased the collective voting 
power of developing and transition countries, but reclassified some advanced economies that 
Vestergaard and Wade suggest keeps the powerful countries in control (Vestergaard & Wade, 
2013). The European Union’s Treaty of Lisbon (2007) has also made substantial changes to the 
representational rights of their members that responded to shifts in authority, governance, and 
membership since the Treaty of Nice (2001), but both structures balanced the institutional 
membership with the population proportionality.  The UN General Assembly operates on a one-
member, one-vote structure, but provides unique representation that reflects the variation in 
political power through bodies like the Security Council.  Proposals to add emerging powers like 
India or Brazil as permanent members to the UN Security Council would be another example of 
an awareness that these structures are capable of evolving to meet member needs amidst 
changing conditions (Ministry of External Affairs, 2017). By contrast, American regional 
literature has relatively few examples of how collective choice arrangements have evolved over 
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time. ACIR (1973) briefly outlined how the City of Cleveland pushed for stronger representation 
in the Northeast Ohio Area Coordinating Agency (NOACA), eventually withdrew from the 
organization, and ultimately led to NOACA being decertified by HUD. Little has been written 
about how collective choice arrangements have evolved over time since 1973. 
Unlike internally administered treaties or interlocal agreements, delegating to a new 
institution provides for a neutral, third party technical staff that responds to the will of the board. 
As a result, these arrangements create a collective principal-agent relationship that impacts the 
actions of the staff of international organizations (Hawkins, 2006). The relationship between a 
RIGO board and its executive director or other staff has not been empirically explored, but 
Hawkins sees parallels:  
 
“It is not inherently more difficult to design effective delegation 
mechanisms at the international level than at the domestic level. There are 
variations in the ease of monitoring and controlling different IOs and in the extent 
to which states are willing to delegate to international agents.” (Hawkins, 2006, 
page 5) 
 
 
One example of the benefits of this delegation is creating common, neutral information 
on which the board can make decisions. International organizations require credible information 
to overcome asymmetries that a technical staff can provide (Keohane, 1990); again it seems 
highly plausible that RIGO staff fulfill the same need in a domestic American regional context 
but has yet to be explored. Another way in which these organizations are similar is that not only 
do the representatives to the board maintain a principal-agent relationship with the RIGO (or IO) 
staff, they also act as principals (either singularly or collectively) with the administrative staff of 
their home government. I am not currently aware of research that has tackled these ideas at either 
the American domestic regional or international scales. 
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Having identified several ways in which RIGO and international organizations both 
provide similar benefits and operate in institutionally similar ways, I discuss in the next section 
ways to import some of the methods and research questions international organizations have 
developed and refined to improve the understanding of RIGOs.  
2.2.3  Importing International Organizations’ Research Methods and Questions to the 
Board Structures of RIGOs 
The literature that has developed to understand international organizations is considerably 
more advanced than that of cross-boundary international organizations (including RIGOs). I 
borrow from these advances to tackle the questions surrounding board structures and the 
representational rights of member governments in RIGOs. The formal modeling of this 
scholarship is quite well developed and is more member-neutral than the domestic regional 
literature. Importing this formal modeling allows for a more holistic view of RIGOs rather than a 
focus on the disparities of central cities relative to population.  
The international organizations literature has built complex game theoretic and 
mathematical models to evaluate their collective choice arrangements, which have not been 
substantially imported into the literature on cross-boundary intergovernmental organizations. 
Most of these models are based on the balances identified earlier between institutional 
membership and population proportionality. Some of these formal models propose an optimal 
structure using different mathematical criteria (Kirsch & Langner, 2011; Słomczyński & 
Życzkowski, n.d.), others tie governance structures to outcomes (Finus, Altamirano-Cabrera, & 
Van Ierland, 2005), while others identify methods through which these balances can be measured 
(Taagepera & Shugart, 1989). The scholarship that has imported any of these concepts to the 
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regional domestic literature is exceptionally limited. Lewis & Sprague applied Taagepera & 
Shugart’s Deviation Index (D) to California Metropolitan Planning Organizations, but focused 
only on the population proportionality. Ensch (2008) identified how closely a limited set of 
Metropolitan Planning Organizations hewed to several similar formal models. However, no 
research has applied these principles to a random sample of cross-boundary intergovernmental 
organizations like RIGOs to present a composite national picture of board structures. 
2.2.4  Limitations of Comparing RIGOs and International Organizations 
While there are a multitude of characteristics that RIGOs and international organizations 
share, there are, as always, limitations. In this section, I identify four such differences. First, I 
discuss the impact of higher levels of government for RIGOs as compared to an anarchic 
international order that relies on norms and reputation. Second, I discuss the division of policy 
across international organizations, as compared to the more holistic RIGOs. Third, I discuss how 
the nested political structures, particularly municipalities within counties, alter the ways in which 
we can import the international organization literature. Fourth, I discuss differences between 
RIGOs and IOs in who is permitted to represent member governments. 
Because local governments created by their respective states that come together form 
RIGOs, the building blocks are different from international organizations. In many states, the 
RIGOs themselves are creatures of the state with boundaries drawn by the state governments (see 
previous discussion in Chapter 1, also Miller in Miller et al., 2018; Whisman, 2013). As a result, 
the state retains the authority to dismantle or reorganize these bodies without the consent of the 
local governments themselves. Florida Governor Rick Scott and the state legislature recently 
abolished the Withlacoochee Regional Planning Council and redistributed its members to other 
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regional planning councils (Crane, 2015). The State of Connecticut also recently reorganized its 
RIGOs (“CT’s Regional Planning Agencies Consolidate, Realign and Disappear,” 2014). In 
some cases, the state not only prescribes the boundaries, but also the representational rights of 
members. However, these representational rights are still negotiated, just by the state’s elected 
officials rather than the members themselves. International organizations have no higher 
authority prescribing or enforcing boundaries, membership and representational rights, therefore 
they rely on norms, sanctions and reputation to ensure fellow members live up to their 
agreements.  As a result, there may be limitations in comparing RIGOs and international 
organizations as they relate to withdrawal, reneging on commitments, or the use of a state’s 
power to reorganize local governments.  
One of the Miller and Nelles’s (2018) criteria of a RIGO is a broad policy agenda, 
however international organizations may have narrower agendas. In some cases, the 
organizations are quite specialized like the International Whaling Commission or the 
International Seabed Authority, while others like the United Nations and European Union are 
quite broad in scope. This becomes a potential limitation when members logroll across different 
policy arenas. While we know little about how this occurs within RIGOs, it would likely happen 
internally (such as trading votes between the RIGO’s roles as Economic Development District 
and Metropolitan Planning Organization). But there is evidence of logrolling occurring across 
multiple international organizations where membership is shared (Dreher, Sturm, & Vreeland, 
2009; Strand & Tuman, 2012). Caution should be exercised when comparing the governance of 
international organizations and RIGOs to ensure the policy agendas are sufficiently broad to 
adequately account for these differences. 
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With a few limited exceptions most international organizations rely on nations as unitary 
actors8. In RIGOs, however, counties and their respective municipalities both may be members 
of their RIGOs. Municipalities may also spill across county borders. These differences do not 
substantively affect the methods international organizations use to understand measure 
proportionality and institutional membership, but does require nuance in the interpretation of 
findings. The electorate of a municipality may be represented dually by municipal and county 
representatives to their RIGO, but there may be cases where those two representatives pursue 
different policy agendas and vote differently.  For that reason, I focus on the representational 
rights of local government members. This is a key methodological distinction that may need 
further modifications, for example, in megaregional governance research. Megaregions often 
span state boundaries and would need to integrate officials from multiple state governments into 
the board structures or potentially cross international borders with corridors like Buffalo-Toronto 
or El Paso-Juarez requiring multi-national board representation.  
Under the governance documents, who is permitted to represent a member government 
may also experience substantial differences, either as a function of their position or 
demographically. There are certainly important distinctions between the authorities and 
prevalence of strong and weak mayors, councils, and managers. However, within RIGOs, it is 
fairly easy to classify potential representatives as elected officials, professional staff, citizens, 
and “others.” Within the potential universe of representatives to international organizations, the 
distinctions between monarchs, prime ministers, ministers, and other appointed officials are far 
                                                 
8 The International Conference on Local Environmental Initiatives allows sub-national actors as members. 
Belarus and Ukraine were full members in the United Nations, despite part of the Soviet Union for several decades 
(Jordan et al., 2001). 
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more diverse. A second aspect to this limitation is the role of minority participation on RIGO 
boards. Communities of color are specifically provided representation on many boards, in part, to 
overcome resistance to regional initiatives. These concerns were well summarized by john a. 
powell:  
[Minority] resistance is often based on non-economic concerns: the loss of 
political control and cultural control or identity. Supporters of regionalism often 
discount these concerns, suggesting that minorities do not have meaningful 
political control or cultural identity to begin with, and that the price paid for this 
minimal control is too high. But to ignore these claims from the minority 
community is a serious mistake, because it underestimates the value of identity 
and makes regionalism feel like another solution imposed on people of color by 
whites who “know better.”(powell, 1999, page 222) 
 
The ability to import or apply an international organizations framework to these two 
specific questions appears highly limited. Summary statistics about these two questions are 
gathered and present interesting future research opportunities, but are not discussed to the same 
depth. 
2.2.5  “The Great Powers” in RIGOs and International Organizations 
Having outlined the similarities between RIGOs and international organizations, I 
contrast in this section the differing ways that new regionalist scholars and international 
organizations scholars view the role of “great powers” within their respective cooperative, 
delegated institutions. Neorealist international relations scholar Kenneth Waltz defines great 
powers as having five criteria: “(1) population and territory, (2) resource endowment, (3) 
economic capability, (4) political stability and competence, and (5) military strength” (Waltz, 
1993, pg. 50). While these criteria were designed to identify nations in international affairs, I 
argue we can think of four of these five criteria (excluding military strength) as necessary factors 
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to classify municipalities9 as “great powers” within their respective regions. Applying these 
criteria in absolute terms at a national scope would likely yield a list dominated by the historic 
center cities of metropolitan regions. The overwhelming body of research on cross-boundary 
intergovernmental organizations has focused on the (under-)representation of these center cities 
relative to their populations and the resulting promotion of suburbanization and sprawl. 
Meanwhile, I demonstrate later in this section that the international organizations literature has 
largely seen “great powers” as using these institutions as tools to accomplish their agendas 
without appearing unilateral. Little empirical evidence suggests that center cities have acted in 
this way within RIGOs, however Ostrom, Tiebout, and Warren (1961) express concern about this 
possibility when they describe “Gargantua” as a “political system with a single dominant center 
for making decisions is viewed as the ideal model for the organization of metropolitan 
government” (V. Ostrom, Tiebout, & Warren, 1961, pg. 831). As a result, we have a continuum 
of the role of “great powers” within organizations from dominant to passive that we can test. 
Before evaluating the literature, a point of clarification is in order on how “great powers” 
can be structured within organizations; organizations (both international and within American 
regions) are not always centered around a single “great power.” Within the literature on 
megaregions, Pain & Taylor (2007) and Schafran (2015) identify what they call Process A and 
Process B regions.  Harrison & Hoyler (2015) challenge several facets of the mega-regional 
concept, but the principles of Process A and Process B have tremendous value applied to both 
American domestic regions and the footprints of international organizations. Process A 
megaregions are those that are built around a primary city. Within RIGOs, these would be local 
                                                 
9 Because most of the new regionalist literature has focused on cities rather than urban counties or other 
territorial distinctions, I focus here on municipalities. 
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government members with an overwhelmingly large population relative to the overall 
population; examples would include San Diego in the San Diego Association of Governments 
(CA) or Chicago within the Chicago Metropolitan Agency for Planning (IL)10. Within 
international organizations, one would similarly classify the role of the United States within 
Organization of American States. Process B megaregions are built more polycentrically. Within 
RIGOs, an example of Process B would be the Maricopa Association of Governments (AZ); it is 
built around four municipalities with populations over 200,000 (Phoenix, Mesa, Glendale and 
Scottsdale). The UN Security Council would be an example of a Process B international 
organization with dedicated membership and specialized voting rules for the United States, 
China, and Russia. These need not be mutually exclusive categories; one could imagine a 
primary large city and an edge city (or multiple edge cities) cooperating together within the same 
RIGO (ex: Orlando and Kissimmee, Florida). These may not always be static designations, 
either. Development and demographic changes may create a need to alter the representational 
rights of members. Proposals to add new nations like Brazil and India as permanent members of 
the UN Security Council to reflect their growth and importance would make that body even more 
polycentric.  
This distinction between RIGOs with single “great powers” and polycentric regions is 
critical to understanding why a more holistic method of analyzing representational rights is 
required. As outlined in Chapter 1, focusing solely on the under-representation of center cities 
reifies the “city-country ideology” (Wachsmuth, 2013) and undervalues the importance smaller 
                                                 
10 While this application focuses on the role of large cities within RIGOs, both Process A and B can be 
applied more generally. For example, Billings (MT) would be the primary city around the Beartooth Resource 
Conservation and Development District.  
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and in-between spaces have in the creation of a region (D. Young & Keil, 2014). The Process A 
vs. Process B distinction provides further evidence for the need to evaluate the region in total, 
rather than the representational rights of any individual member.  
Much of the regionalist literature has portrayed the central cities as outnumbered by a 
one-member, one-vote board structure that allocates federal funding for local priorities over 
regional ones and promotes sprawl. Adhikari (2015) describes these boards as such: “Despite 
having an undertone of regional-type institution, they had a fragmented core-structure made up 
of local representatives coerced for forced collaboration. Competition for federal grants soon 
rekindled rivalry among participating localities” (page 15). Much of the work focused on the 
under-representation of center cities has evaluated the governance of Metropolitan Planning 
Organizations. Benjamin, Kincaid, & McDowell (1994) created an index of central city voting 
power for MPOs and found that “central city residents are underrepresented on 68 MPO 
policymaking boards (79 percent)” (pg. 31). Sanchez (2006) evaluated the top fifty largest MPOs 
and found that urban areas represented 59% of the total population, but only 29% of the votes on 
MPO boards. Nelson et al., (2003) identified that for each additional suburban vote on an MPO 
board, 1-7% of funding for transit is re-allocated to highways.  Orfield and Luce (2012) present 
table after table comparing other large metropolitan areas to Portland and the Twin Cities to 
demonstrate the value of those two unique regional organizations on measures of sprawl, equity, 
and economic growth. As a result, the perception of center cities on these boards within the new 
regionalist literature is hardly that of a “great power” despite their population, territory and 
economic prowess. 
In contrast, much of the international organizations literature sees “great powers” as 
exercising a quiet form of dominance over lesser players. Formal governance of these bodies 
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gives smaller players a collective veto that could subvert the agenda of a great power; however, 
this is a highly rare occurrence. This is as true for polycentric organizations as it is for those with 
a primary “great power.” The rotating members outnumber the permanent members of the UN 
Security Council, 8-7. However those collective rotating members have never successfully 
advanced a resolution utilizing their majority (even symbolically) over the objections of the 
permanent members. The “voice” reforms of the IMF in 2010 gave the illusion of developing 
economies gaining authority in the organization, but were seen as largely token changes 
(Vestergaard & Wade, 2013). Similar trends occur throughout international organizations where 
the “great powers” hold a minority of formal power but utilize informal leverage to ensure their 
agenda is consistently achieved (Stone, 2013).  Japan utilizes its foreign aid to ensure smaller 
governments vote in line with its interests on the International Whaling Commission (Strand & 
Tuman, 2012). Unlike center cities, “great powers” on the international scene are portrayed as 
using international organizations to meet their objectives without appearing unilateral. 
2.3 Conclusion 
I take no normative position on what the role of center cities ought to be within a RIGO 
(formally or informally) nor do I take a position on what form of collective choice arrangements 
is optimal for a RIGO. However, neither public choice nor regionalist scholarship alone is 
sufficient to address these issues. Neither perspective “[provides] a satisfactory lens through 
which to engage with the contemporary problems of city-regions, as they mask the political 
exigencies and concerns that affect intra-regional communities” (Glass, 2018, pg. 1). In response 
to this call for additional perspectives, I introduced in this chapter some concepts, methods, and 
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research questions from the international organizations literature to a better understanding of 
RIGOs. The parallel between RIGOs and international organizations is strong, especially 
pertaining to a government’s desire for autonomy, the benefits that government gains from 
cooperation, and the need for sufficient voice in an organization delegated to undertake that 
cooperation. The ways both of these classes of institutions implement their governance share 
substantial commonality as well. While there are limitations, importing the broad concepts of the 
international organizations presents a wealth of opportunities to answer how cross-boundary 
intergovernmental organizations undertake collective action. 
The previous domestic scholarship has focused almost exclusively on the population  
(dis-)proportionality in representation of center cities within cross-boundary intergovernmental 
organizations and its implications for perpetuating sprawl and exacerbating blight in urban areas. 
At the other end of the spectrum, international organizations scholars view “great powers” as far 
more dominant in their organizations than new regionalist literature view “great powers” do in 
theirs. Perhaps as a response to this dominance, the international organizations literature has used 
more member-neutral methods to investigate collective choice arrangements. Using these 
principles reflected on RIGOs can generate a more comprehensive understanding of the 
representational rights of large and small local governments. 
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3.0 Methods 
Like all forms of institutions, RIGOs are a collection of rules and norms that constrain 
behavior (March & Olsen, 1989). A RIGO’s bylaws and other governance documents codify the 
formal processes that structure these interactions. These documents are the focus of the 
dissertation in three different ways: a national perspective on RIGOs using coding and 
quantitative methods, a demonstration of how a RIGO can use these quantitative methods to 
evaluate different proposal for collective choice arrangements, and how these methods can 
quantify how a RIGO’s collective choice arrangements change over time (either by amendment, 
change in the environment, or both).   This chapter outlines the steps in which I engaged to 
collect, interpret, and analyze these governance documents. 
I argue that demographics and political structures are necessary to understand RIGO 
collective choice arrangements, but not sufficient. Local governments collectively consider a 
variety of other elements in crafting collective choice arrangements, including but not limited to: 
state legislation, the policy areas in which these organizations operate, path dependencies, and 
regional history. Many of these elements are also not yet well understood in the context of 
regional governance. Identifying the impact and interactions of all these components on 
collective choice arrangements is outside the scope of this dissertation. My approach to methods 
recognizes these limitations and puts these findings in their greater context. 
I have chosen to pursue a multiple methods approach to generate complementary insights 
on this variation. While sometimes used interchangeably, I intentionally use “multiple methods” 
rather than “mixed methods” to avoid confusion (Ahmed & Sil, 2012). While my methods share 
similarities to mixed-method concepts like Lieberman’s nested analysis (2005), I do not, for 
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example, seek to test formal models through case selection. These multiple methods demonstrate 
three different contributions of the quantitative methods for measuring institutional membership 
and population proportionality, but are not intended, for example, to generate causal conclusions. 
I begin by describing the universe of RIGOs and the sample from which I drew; all the 
information in the following chapters comes from organizations within this sample.  
3.1 About the Sample 
Throughout 2017, I collected governance documents from a random sample of Regional 
Intergovernmental Organizations (RIGOs) using the database available at the University of 
Pittsburgh's Center for Metropolitan Studies (CMS) website. The original dataset identifies, 
county by county11, the cross-boundary organization with the largest geographic scope to which 
the county belongs. Often these organizations meet the definition of RIGOs, but may not 
always12. In some cases, a region’s MPO may not have the policy scope to qualify as a RIGO 
(ex: Erie County, NY [Buffalo] or Marion County, IN [Indianapolis]). In other instances, the 
region’s organization may directly elect or have some other appointment process independent of 
local governments (ex: Portland Metro or Twin Cities’ Met Council). Some counties may not 
have any affiliation with a cross-boundary organization (ex: Western Wyoming). From this list 
                                                 
11 The database also uses municipalities when counties do not substantially align with participation in the 
organization (ex: New Hampshire) or when a municipality operates independent of a county (ex: many localities in 
Virginia). 
12 Figure 1 shows the distinctions between RIGOs, Regional MPOs, Unique Organizations, and Unattached 
Counties. 
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of counties, the 477 organizations that meet the definition of a RIGO constitute the universe for 
this research.  
Given the minimal research on RIGOs thus far, a simple random sample was conducted.  
A total of 181 RIGOs were sampled, and governance documents from 150 RIGOs were 
collected. This resulted in a conversion rate of 83%. I collected any available RIGO bylaws, 
charters, joint powers agreements, handbooks, state statutes, articles of association and web 
content that allowed me to populate the database with reliable information directly from the 
organization itself or, as appropriate, under state mandate. In some cases, this information was 
publicly posted to their website. In others, I made phone calls and sent emails to executive 
directors and other staff. While I made significant efforts to fully populate the database with 
complete information, some documents were incomplete and my outreach was not returned. In 
one instance, the Southeast Wyoming Economic Development District, the bylaws give few 
formal requirements for membership, representation, and selection. This was confirmed to be an 
informal process by staff. These 150 RIGOs constitute the sample. 
Thirty-seven states had multiple RIGOs randomly sampled; nine states had a single 
RIGO selected. Local governments in Nebraska and the District of Columbia were not selected 
in the sample. Hawai’i, Delaware, and Rhode Island have no RIGOs. See Figure 2 for the 
distribution by state. The five most populous RIGOs included in the dataset are: Chicago 
Metropolitan Agency for Planning, Association of Bay Area Governments, Delaware Valley 
Regional Planning Commission (Philadelphia), Southeast Michigan Council of Governments 
(Detroit), and the Maricopa Association of Governments (Phoenix). The five least populous 
RIGOs were the Prince William Sound Economic Development District (Alaska), Southeast 
Montana Development Corporation, Great Northern Development Corporation (Montana), 
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Southwest Alaska Municipal Conference, and the Tri-County Regional Development Council 
(North Dakota). 66% of the sample function as the region's Metropolitan Planning 
Organizations13; 38% function as Economic Development Districts. 
 
 
 
                                                 
13 These are "integrated urban" regions from Miller and Nelles (2018). There may be MPOs functioning 
within the geographic footprint of other RIGOs, but they are organizationally distinct from the RIGO. 
Figure 2 Map of RIGOs Included in Sample by State Figure 2 Map of RIGOs Included in Sample 
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3.2 Membership, Selection, and Representation 
To provide clarity throughout the dissertation, I present definitions and distinctions here 
between three different characteristics of board structures: membership, selection, and 
representation. Within each of these traits, I demonstrate some common components that 
complicate the previous perception that these bodies are overwhelmingly structured as “one 
member, one vote.” Whether entirely through internal negotiations or influenced by state 
legislation, RIGOs have highly refined and sophisticated strategies and techniques to balance the 
decision-making authority of local governments. These processes result in highly variable 
governance documents, and more importantly, likely lead to highly variable outcomes. 
3.2.1  Defining Membership 
In the context of this research on RIGO boards, membership is defined as those general-
purpose local governments eligible for singular or collective voting membership in the body’s 
most inclusive chamber. Bylaws and other governance documents make this explicit with 
language like this from the Associated Governments of Northwest Colorado: “The Association 
hereby is composed of the Counties: (1) Garfield, (2) Mesa, (3) Moffat, (4) Rio Blanco, and (5) 
Routt, and the Municipal Corporations therein” (Associated Governments of Northwest 
Colorado, 2009). While proclamations like this often coincides with membership, the definition 
also requires a vote in the body’s most inclusive chamber. I discuss the distinctions among 
chambers and special voting rules later within this chapter. It should suffice to say at this point 
that an investigation into the division of decision-making authority ought to, at minimum, require 
a local government to have voting privileges in its most inclusive chamber.  
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However, in many cases, local governments are aggregated together and given collective 
voting privileges, even in the most inclusive chamber. Collective representation can affect 
counties, municipalities, or both; I refer to these members as multijurisdictional. Minnesota State 
Law codifies multijurisdictional membership for municipalities based on population: “A 
commission shall consist of the following members: … (5) one mayor or council member from a 
municipality of under 10,000 population from each county, selected by the mayors of all such 
municipalities in the county;” MN Stat § 462.388 (2016). In the East-West Gateway Council of 
Governments (St. Louis, MO-IL), two smaller counties (Franklin and Jefferson) on the Missouri 
side of the Mississippi River are afforded a single collective vote that alternates between the two 
counties but is consented to by both sets of county commissioners. The strategy of 
multijurisdictional membership is also used when one city (usually the largest) is given distinct 
singular membership, and the balance of municipalities within that county receives collective 
membership. The Chicago Metropolitan Agency for Planning provides multijurisdictional 
membership to the balance of municipalities within Cook County. The City of Lansing 
(Michigan) stretches into all three counties of the Tri-County Regional Planning Commission 
and has its own designated membership to the board; the remainder of each county is provided 
multijurisdictional membership. Multijurisdictional membership can also reflect differences in 
political structure. The Capital Area Regional Planning Commission (Madison, WI) provides 
representation to both the Dane County Towns Association and the Dane County Cities and 
Villages Association. About 24% of the RIGOs in the sample have at least one 
multijurisdictional member. 
Based on the information in these governance documents, the information on their 
website, and from the Center for Metropolitan Studies database, I confirmed the geographic 
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footprint of the RIGO to determine all eligible general-purpose local government members. This 
list of eligible members includes those who have elected not to participate and organizations so 
noted that represent local governments (e.g. councils of government, municipal conferences, 
etc.). Special districts, school districts, and state and federal agencies were omitted, as they fall 
outside the scope of the research questions. 
Based on the membership of a RIGO, I classify them along a spectrum from county-
dominant to municipally-dominant. A RIGO consisting entirely of counties is a Type I RIGO. A 
RIGO that provides membership to counties and some municipalities is a Type II RIGO. In some 
cases, RIGOs provide membership to all counties and municipalities within their specified 
region; there are Type III. In states where counties are negligible or non-existent, RIGOs may be 
municipalities-only (Type IV). Table 1 below outlines these differences, the frequency within the 
sample and Bernoulli confidence intervals for an estimate across the population of RIGOs. To be 
clear, this is a spectrum with categories for heuristic purposes. Following the descriptions of 
representation and selection, I present some examples of gradations within these classifications. 
 
 
Table 1 RIGOs by Membership Type 
Type Description  % 
Frequency 
in Sample 
% of Estimated Population 
(95% Bernoulli Confidence Interval) 
I Counties Only 12.84% 7.45% - 18.23% 
II Counties and Some 
Municipalities 
19.59% 13.20% - 25.98% 
III Counties and All Municipalities 60.14% 52.25% - 68.03% 
IV Municipalities Only 7.43% 3.20% - 11.66% 
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The myriad ways that RIGO governance documents define membership is an important 
finding by itself.  Even when a RIGO’s collective choice arrangements indicate there is “one-
member, one-vote” it cannot be assumed that all local governments are eligible to be members or 
that each member is only one local government. Type I, II, and IV RIGOs all limit which local 
governments are eligible for membership. Multijurisdictional membership could mean multiple 
counties or municipalities share representational rights. These more complicated definitions 
could be used for, among other things, balancing members’ votes by population without 
weighting (like Franklin and Jefferson in the East-West Gateway Council of Governments). 
These definitions could also provide for specific membership based on political structure (like 
the Dane County Towns Association in the Capital Area Regional Planning Commission) or by 
limiting membership to the most relevant forms of local government to the RIGO’s purpose (like 
Type IV RIGOs in three New England states). In some states, local government membership 
may be mandated through state legislation (see discussion of New Hampshire in Chapter 4). 
 
3.2.2  Defining Representation 
Membership is a characteristic of a local government; representation is afforded to 
individuals. Here I define representational rights as the number of seats and votes to which a 
general-purpose local government is entitled, and any constraints on who may hold those seats. I 
distinguish between seats and votes to reflect the different ways a RIGO board may choose to 
allocate them. In some cases, board governance documents prescribe the number of seats to 
which a local government is entitled based on population thresholds. One such example is the 
Richmond Regional Planning District in Virginia. Counties and independent cities are 
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automatically members; other municipal governments must have 3,500 residents to get a vote on 
the board. This means the smallest of local governments do not get an individual vote; their 
respective counties represent them. Members then have population thresholds to give additional 
representatives at 7,501, at 25,001, at 50,001, at 100,001, at 175,001 and at 250,001. In other 
cases, representatives may be equal in number on the board but have their vote weighted by 
factors outlined in the governance documents. In the High Country Council of Governments in 
northwestern North Carolina, the Executive Committee consists of two representatives from each 
county (one elected official from the county and one elected official selected by caucus from 
municipalities)14. Under the provision for weighted voting in the Executive Committee, each 
representative is entitled to one vote and additional votes for every 10,000 people in their 
jurisdiction or fraction thereof.  
With the number of seats and votes outlined, governance documents may also prescribe 
who is entitled to be appointed to these positions15. This can take two forms: the position of the 
appointee and whom the position is to represent. The position of the appointee takes three forms: 
ex officio, classes of positions, and no constraints. Ex officio positions are any representatives 
named in the bylaws by virtue of the elected office they hold. In most cases, these are mayors, 
county executives, or council presidents. Classes of positions means any group of people from 
whom there is latitude in the selection; this includes elected officials, citizens, or professional 
                                                 
14 The Executive Committee also includes one representative from minority organizations appointed at 
large. Because this person does not represent a general-purpose local government, they are not included. 
15 Local governments may have internal formal regulations or informal customs as to who receives 
representation. This research only investigates constraints on representation outlined in the RIGO governance 
documents. 
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staff16. In other cases, the local government may be entirely free to choose whomever they so 
choose to represent them on the RIGO board; these representatives are classified as “no 
constraints.” I describe more precise coding within these categories later in the chapter.  
The local government may also need to comply with constraints on what sub-population 
the appointment is to represent. These take two primary forms: geographic constraints and 
minority representation. Geographic constraints are any restriction in representation based on the 
municipality (or area within a municipality) the representative lives. The Chicago Metropolitan 
Agency for Planning has these constraints in place for multijurisdictional municipal members 
within Cook County. The bylaws outline the boundaries for each sub-region of Cook County, 
down to street names that delineate. In the Brooke-Hancock-Jefferson Metropolitan Planning 
Commission (Weirton, WV – Steubenville, OH), bylaws state that three citizens17 from both 
Brooke and Hancock counties are to be appointed on behalf of the local governments. Because 
Weirton is the largest city and straddles both counties, each county is required to select one 
citizen from Weirton living within their respective counties.  
Minority representation is any requirement that constrains member delegation selection 
based on ethnic background. There is an important distinction here between organizations or at-
large representatives that represent minorities with a voice on a RIGO board and local 
government members required to select members based on ethnic background. The Appalachian 
Council of Governments (Greenville, SC) bylaws require that county councils select at least one 
representative from a minority ethnic background; counties over 200,000 must select at least 
                                                 
16 In exceptional cases, professional staff such as municipal engineers or managers are named ex officio as 
members of the RIGO board. For consistency’s sake, all professional staff appointments are classified together. 
17 Bylaws refer to them as Community Interest Representatives. 
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two. This is an example of a required constraint on a local government’s representation.  
Thirteen such provisions are found in the random sample of governance documents (8.72%). The 
Lewis & Clark Regional Development Council (Bismarck, North Dakota) provides a seat to 
“…represent identifiable and organized minority groups existing in the region. Selection of this 
member shall be made by the regional council upon recommendations by minority groups” 
(Constitution and Bylaws of the Lewis & Clark Regional Development Council, 2014). This 
provision would not be classified as minority representation because it does not impact a local 
government’s delegation to the RIGO. 
3.2.3  Defining Selection 
When governance documents permit member latitude in the composition of their 
delegation, that member may have single or joint authority in the selection of the representative. 
The concept of selection can take five forms: ex officio, selection by county, selection by 
municipality, joint selection by county/municipality, or selection by some other method. Ex 
officio positions on RIGO boards have no selection component. Some bylaws may offer these 
officeholders appointment powers for designees or alternates; however this authority is retained 
by the officeholder specifically, not the local government member more generally. Where 
selection is found, it is exercised overwhelmingly by county or by municipality and done so 
internally. On rarer occasions, municipalities may have external and unilateral selection authority 
for a member in a county delegation. The Southern Iowa Council of Governments clearly defines 
itself as a Type I (Counties Only) RIGO, referring to member delegations as “county boards.” 
However, the counties are required to give appointment power to the mayor (or his/her designee) 
for the three largest municipalities in each county.  Joint selection occurs when a county (or 
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counties) and their respective municipalities share in the selection process. This can happen as it 
does in the Wasatch Front Regional Council (Salt Lake City, UT). Here, each representative is 
nominated from the county councils of governments18, meaning that all the members (including 
the county and member municipalities) make these decisions cooperatively. Finally, selection 
can happen through some other method. In most cases, this involves relevant state actors 
including governors or state legislators. In the East Central Wisconsin Regional Planning 
Commission (Appleton-Oshkosh), each county member has at least three representatives. For 
one of these representatives in each county, the County Board provides two names to the 
governor from which he/she selects the appointee. The governor has particularly strong roles on 
boards in Wisconsin and Florida. 
3.2.4  Continuum of Membership for RIGOs from County- to Municipally-Dominant 
The typology presented earlier uses membership to outline four generic categories within 
the continuum of RIGOs from county- to municipally-dominant, but there is much more nuance 
to this picture than a four-category structure initially paints. Membership, representation, and 
selection each play important roles in the sharing of decision-making authority among local 
governments. Creating something more granular than the four types is more methodologically 
problematic. Aggregating these ordinal concepts objectively into one value requires a level of 
knowledge of these governance structures that scholarship is unprepared to justify. However, I 
present the following three examples of how gradations can occur within a given board structure. 
                                                 
18 Miller and Nelles (2018) refer to cross-boundary organizations operating at a smaller footprint than the 
RIGOs simply as Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs).  
 59 
Within membership, we could potentially see something that currently defies the four 
types when municipalities and some counties constitute the board. Within the sample, there were 
no examples of this, but this hypothetical is certainly plausible. Imagine a single-county RIGO 
where all the local governments are eligible members (making it a Type III). The board 
authorizes membership for an important municipality in the neighboring county, but not the 
county government itself. Now, we have all the eligible municipalities outlined in the bylaws, 
but the neighboring county is not an eligible member. This research evaluates eligible members 
regardless of whether these members are active participants or not; as a result, the questions I ask 
are more de jure than de facto. However, I am aware of at least two de facto cases of this 
phenomenon. The North Country Council serves the northernmost parts of New Hampshire 
across three counties: all of Coos, and parts of Carroll and Grafton. All three counties are eligible 
to be members, making this a Type III RIGO, but only Grafton currently has a representative on 
the board. A similar occurrence is found in the Mo-Kan Regional Council (St. Joseph, MO-KS); 
the municipalities of Brown County, Kansas have collective voting privileges on the board and 
the county government does not. 
Representation also impacts how county- or municipally-dominant a RIGO board 
structure is. When a board is the purest form of Type I or Type IV, all the votes are allocated to 
either counties or municipalities. Within Type II RIGOs, there is some ratio of votes allocated to 
counties versus municipalities. In the Baltimore Metropolitan Council, 14% of votes are 
allocated to municipalities (the independent city of Baltimore). In the Purchase Area 
Development District (Paducah, KY), 47% of the votes are allocated to municipalities. As a 
result, Baltimore Metropolitan Council is a more county-dominant RIGO than the Purchase Area 
Development District. It is unclear whether the classes of positions eligible for representation, 
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geographic constraints or minority representation requirements can be understood in the context 
of the county- to municipally-dominant spectrum, other than to say no constraints (with 
unilateral internal selection) would be preferable to any constraint. 
The final characteristic, selection, affects this spectrum as well. Most municipalities or 
counties have full internal control over this aspect of board structure, when there is latitude. This 
is most easily portrayed within a Type I (Counties Only) RIGO. When counties have full internal 
selection authority, they are more county-dominant than those who share that authority with their 
respective municipalities. This was highlighted earlier with the Southern Iowa Council of 
Governments, where the mayors of the three largest cities could appoint members to the county 
delegation. This board is one of the least county-dominant Type I RIGOs found in the sample. 
3.3 Chambers and Specialized Voting Rules within a RIGO 
With representatives selected to serve on the board, this section outlines how RIGOs 
make decisions. This represents a crucial departure from previous empirical scholarship that has 
relied on rosters of representatives to a RIGO board. Without the governance documents a RIGO 
uses, research has masked the options and layers of decision-making authority and how 
membership, representation, and selection manifest within those layers. The division of 
responsibility and representation among those layers was the product of negotiation and consent 
through state legislation, internal to the RIGO members, or some combination of the two. To 
make assessments of disproportionality by evaluating a roster of the most inclusive chamber 
absent an understanding of the rules for decision-making has severe limitations in drawing valid 
conclusions and implications. This section outlines two common components of governance 
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documents that give local government members more tools than a simple "one member, one 
vote" structure would indicate: multiple chambers and specialized voting rules. 
3.3.1  Multiple Chambers 
In 83% of RIGOs, decision-making authority is divided between higher and lower 
chambers. There is no consistent naming convention across RIGOs; one RIGO's Board of 
Directors (lower chamber) is another's Executive Committee (higher chamber). I refer to them 
throughout based on their relative inclusivity and exclusivity19, but each is a comprehensive 
organizational body and not single-function or single-policy committees20.  In some cases, higher 
chambers consist of officers and/or at-large representatives elected directly from the lower 
chamber. In other cases, governance documents prescribe specific allocations of representation 
based on criteria that account for differences in geography, population, or forms of government. 
The West Florida Regional Council (Destin) Executive Committee has five seats: the elected 
Chair, elected Vice Chair, and three representatives from local governments other than those 
represented by the Chair and Vice Chair. Those three executive committee members must 
represent a member county, a member city, and a gubernatorial appointee. Allocations like these 
are no accident; this is a conscious strategy to ensure sustainable representation from key 
                                                 
19 In five circumstances, decision-making authority is split into three chambers. In these cases, I refer to the 
middle chamber as such. 
20 In some cases, a more exclusive chamber may take on additional "committee-like" roles, but is still 
considered the higher chamber. One such example is the Finance/Executive Committee of the Eastgate Regional 
Council of Governments (Youngstown, OH). 
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players. Similarly, the decisions the more exclusive and more inclusive chambers are permitted 
to make are also ways in which boards can ensure sustainable representation.  
3.3.2  Specialized Voting Rules 
Within both more inclusive and more exclusive chambers, specialized voting rules may 
be put into place to account for differences in geography, population, or forms of government. In 
nearly all cases, these rules appear to give extra weight based primarily on population. How 
these processes balance population proportionality and the individual autonomy of their local 
governments varies widely, but I classify these concepts into two categories: multiple voting 
rules and multiple testing.  
In some cases, governance documents outline multiple routes in which policy can be 
adopted by the board. When adoption requires only one of these paths, these are multiple voting 
rules. In some cases, these rules can be in place for certain kinds of decisions. The charter of the 
Franklin Regional Council of Governments (Greenfield, MA) has a formula for allocating votes 
based on a combination of population and property assessments of each municipality, but this 
formula is only applied for decisions on appropriations. For all other votes, it follows a one-
member, one-vote structure. In other RIGOs, members can request a vote under alternate rules. 
The Cowlitz-Wahkiakum Council of Governments (Longview, WA) allows members to call for 
a vote under special rules that prescribe a specified number of votes per local government based 
on population21. If this rule is not exercised, the board also operates on a one-member, one-vote 
structure.  
                                                 
21 Special districts remain under one-member, one-vote. 
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In a few notable, but rare exceptions, local government members have agreed to multiple 
voting rules where policy must meet two differently calculated majorities to be adopted. In all 
four of the cases identified in the sample, these are major metropolitan areas (Detroit, 
Sacramento, Phoenix, and San Diego). All four of them require both a majority of members 
present and a majority of the populations they represent to adopt policy, however each of them 
operate slightly differently22.  
Both the San Diego Association of Governments and Maricopa Association of 
Governments demonstrate the differences between a Process A and Process B region (see 
previous discussion in Chapter 2, also Pain & Taylor, 2007; Schafran, 2015).  The San Diego 
Association of Governments (a single county, Process A RIGO) requires both a one-member, 
one-vote majority and a weighted vote majority. The representatives from the City and the 
County of San Diego must agree on how to divide their collective institutional and weighted 
votes. The weighted vote is based on the percentage population of each municipality, but ensures 
no individual member has more than 40% of the vote. Both this shared representation between 
city and county and a maximum vote percentage ensures that the primary city cannot unilaterally 
(or with a token coalition) dominate the agenda. The Maricopa Association of Governments (a 
Process B RIGO) similarly allows for its votes to be allocated weighted by population, but 
without the requirement that no member receive more than 40%. However, a single municipality 
dominating this RIGO is much less likely; Phoenix, Glendale, Scottsdale, and Mesa are all cities 
                                                 
22 The Southeast Michigan Council of Governments provides some voting rights to non-general purpose 
local governments in the region, mostly to special districts. They use a complex formula to apportion all these votes 
according to population. The Sacramento Area Council of Governments multiple testing policy will be discussed in 
great detail in Chapter 6. 
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of more than 200,000 people. As a result, the provision that limits the City of San Diego to 40% 
in the San Diego Association of Governments is not necessary here. 
 
3.4 Using “A Grammar of Institutions” to Understand Governance Documents 
RIGOs also institutionally align with Elinor Ostrom’s (1990) framework for institutions 
that oversee common property resources. Local government budgets are considered common 
property resources (Kavanagh et al., 2017); RIGO budgets are a logical extension of this concept 
with local government members in place of departments or agencies.  Each of the eight traits 
Ostrom identifies is readily apparent within RIGO governance documents. As the local 
governments themselves oversee territory, the boundaries and membership are co-terminous. 
Except in a few limited cases where states completely prescribe them, RIGOs have a range from 
some amount to complete self-determination for their collective choice arrangements. In all 
cases, RIGOs operate with the consent of their respective states and the federal government. The 
RIGO’s administrative staff provides monitoring functions to ensure the will of the board is 
advanced. As a result of the administrative staff executing the board’s wishes, sanctions are 
rarely necessary. Finally, through the board’s direction and the staff’s effort, the organization 
ensures that disbursement rules and local conditions are aligned. When the federal government 
increases its aid (e.g. Obama’s 2009 stimulus package for “shovel-ready” projects), RIGOs 
responded to changes in their local conditions to take advantage of the opportunity.  
This framework is divisible within the RIGO governance documents using Ostrom and 
Crawford’s (1995) components of rules: attributes, aims, deontics, conditions, and “or else.” 
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Table 2 provides examples of each component found in typical governance documents, upon 
which much of the coding methods is based: 
 
 
Table 2 Components of Rules as Applied to RIGO Governance Documents 
 
Component Definition 
(Crawford & Ostrom, 1995) 
Examples from Typical Governance 
Documents 
Attribute “a holder for any value of a 
participant-level variable that 
distinguishes to whom the 
institutional statement applies” 
 General Purpose Local Governments 
 Representatives 
 Executive Committee 
Aim “a holder that describes 
particular actions or outcomes 
to which the deontic is 
assigned” 
 Presence of Representatives for 
Quorum 
 Percent Constituting a Majority 
Deontic “a holder for the three modal 
verbs using deontic logic: may, 
must and must not” 
Other examples include: 
 “Is entitled to”  
 “Shall” 
 “Cannot”  
Conditions “a holder for those variables 
which define when, where, 
how, and to what extent an aim 
is permitted, obligatory, or 
forbidden” 
 
 Exercising Special Voting Rules 
 Population Thresholds for Number of 
Representatives 
“Or Else” “a holder for those variables 
which define the sanctions to be 
imposed for not following a 
rule” 
 
 Failure to Adopt Policy 
 Failure to Receive Federal Funding 
 Failure to Hold a Legitimate Meeting 
(Quorum) 
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The clarity provided by Ostrom and Crawford’s components of rules allows for content 
analysis to be done reliably without multiple coders. Unlike with other forms of text where 
subjective interpretation can lead to different results, these governance documents can be 
diagrammed reliably so long as the deontics are mandatory. Where governance documents use 
weaker deontics like “should” or “ought,” those provisions are ignored in the coding process. As 
a result, there is minimal opportunity for variation in individual interpretation. The following 
section outlines how I coded governance documents to generate the summary statistics and other 
quantitative findings about RIGOs throughout the dissertation.  
3.4.1  RIGO Characteristics Collected for Each Member 
To make the aggregation and disaggregation of each unit of analysis more manageable, I 
collected some general information about each RIGO in the sample. The random sample was 
based on RIGOs, but the unit of analysis is each general-purpose local government member23. I 
gave each RIGO a code consistent with its listing in the online Center for Metropolitan Studies 
(CMS) database using state initials and a two-digit number. I also input the total RIGO 
population as listed in the CMS database, based on the 2010 Census24. When available in the 
governance document, I recorded the year of most revisions or amendments. In many cases, the 
date of most recent bylaw amendments may not correspond to renegotiated governance 
                                                 
23 As a result, this is a cluster sampling method. Valid inferences can be drawn about the population of 
RIGOs, but not for individual local governments. 
24 When I had each RIGO's eligible local government members' populations, I further validated this 
number.  
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outcomes. However, this is an easily acquirable data point for how "living" the documents are. I 
also recorded whether the RIGO utilizes multiple testing in any of its chambers. 
When a RIGO has multiple chambers for decision-making, I selected the chamber with 
the most specifications for representation based on geographic, demographic or political 
structure criteria. To uniformly choose the higher or lower chamber could miss specific 
provisions negotiated and included to protect certain members' interests. The same would hold 
true for choosing chambers based on certain functions, such as appropriations, or Transportation 
Improvement Program and Comprehensive Economic Development Strategy approval. A local 
government may want to protect its voice in a higher chamber to set the agenda or to develop the 
budget or planning document. Using a rule that evaluates the chambers based on geographic, 
demographic or political structure criteria for representation ensures I capture the maximum 
amount of this variation. In all but one instance in the sample, determining which chamber had 
the most specifications was obvious on its face. The only exception to this is the Capital Area 
Council of Governments (Austin, TX). The RIGO’s general assembly provides counties and 
municipalities with additional representatives based on a formula for population; the executive 
committee names specific representational rights for each county, the City of Austin, and 
collective representational rights for small, medium, and large cities (excluding Austin). The 
executive committee was chosen because it named specific representational rights rather than 
rely solely on a formula. I also recorded how many chambers the RIGO has in total and which 
combination of counties and municipalities are eligible for membership in its most inclusive 
chamber, based on the Type I-IV classification described earlier in this chapter. 
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3.4.2  Membership, Representation, and Selection Characteristics Collected for Each 
Eligible General Purpose Local Government 
Based on the eligible membership for the selected chamber, I used a 2010 Census list of 
all county and sub-county governments to include all potential members with singular or 
collective voting rights. For jurisdictions with individual voting rights, I collected and recorded 
the five-digit FIPS codes for counties and ten-digit FIPS codes for sub-county governments and 
their 2010 Census populations.25 These FIPS codes allow for additional information the Census 
Bureau has collected to be merged easily as new research questions emerge. I recorded their state 
to readily identify when a RIGO crossed state borders. Unlike the CMS database, municipalities 
and counties with membership in multiple RIGOs are not classified by a primary or secondary 
affiliation. Twelve counties and eight municipalities are members of more than one RIGO in the 
sample. Jurisdictions with collective voting rights are coded under a separate multijurisdictional 
membership binary variable; I recorded 2010 Census populations for multijurisdictional county 
members. 
I coded local government members' (either individual or multijurisdictional) 
representation in ways that easily allow for standardization, despite the vast variation in 
representation schemes. In two separate variables, I coded for the number of seats and votes to 
which each member is entitled. This allows for easily summation by RIGO to determine 
percentages while maintaining the integrity of the original data. I also recorded the fewest 
number of votes in the bylaws to which a local government was prescribed. This is important for 
                                                 
25 I also dissociated these ten-digit FIPS codes and concatenated into seven-digit FIPS codes to omit single 
municipalities that span multiple counties. 
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the formula I use to calculate each RIGO's Institutional Membership Score (results in Chapter 4). 
For RIGOs with dual testing, I standardized each member's votes based on the average 
percentage for each test. For example, if a municipality was 10% of the membership vote and 
20% of the population vote, this would average to 15%. This is an imperfect approximation, but 
creating a separate binary variable to identify dual testing RIGOs allows for easy exclusion, 
when necessary. I coded geographic, special district, and minority representation requirements as 
dichotomous for members where that was a requirement. 
Constraints on who may represent members are coded across ten categories as 
percentages so that original values can be regenerated.  The ten categories are as follows: (1 & 2) 
ex officio representatives that are elected officials of municipalities or counties; (3, 4, & 5) 
representatives required to be elected officials (but not one specific officeholder) that could hold 
office in a municipality or in a county; or there could be latitude to choose a county or municipal 
elected official; (6) professional staff members such as a town manager or engineer named to 
serve as a representative to a RIGO board (either ex officio or as a class of position); (7) a 
member may have the flexibility to choose any elected official or professional staff from within 
its jurisdiction; (8) bylaws may prescribe that a certain percentage or number of representatives 
be citizens not holding elected office or professional positions within the jurisdiction; (9) any 
other required representation constraining a member's choices; and (10) no constraints on 
representation. By collecting this information in percentage form, these values easily can be 
averaged to generate the constraints on local government members in the sample or multiplied by 
the total number of seats to identify the original values.  
I coded selection constraints similarly to representation using percentages to easily 
average or regenerate original values. Ex officio representatives are not selected, but these values 
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are carried over from the representative section to ensure totals equaled 100%. Selection can 
occur four ways: (1) by county (or counties), (2) by municipality (or municipalities), (3) by a 
joint process of counties and municipalities, or (4) through some other actor (usually a governor 
or state legislators). This method also allows me to identify cross-over selections (e.g. where 
municipalities select representatives for a county delegation or vice versa) by comparing the 
codes for county or municipality of the member with the percentages provided in these 
categories.  
3.5 Analysis of Coding Scheme 
This coding scheme generates a comprehensive and granular approach to understanding 
RIGO governance documents. Prior research has either used the cross-boundary 
intergovernmental organizations as the unit of analysis (Advisory Commission on 
Intergovernmental Relations, 1973; Wyman, 1994) or compared the center city’s representation 
rights to the organization writ large (Benjamin, Kincaid, & McDowell, 1994). This research has 
been done primarily through surveys or imputing from rosters. These new methods rely on the 
original governance documents that reduce interpretation. The coding scheme makes each local 
government member the unit of analysis and this information then is aggregated up through 
cluster sampling. As a result, the aggregate values generated for each RIGO reflect the variation 
of each region more completely. The role of center cities as “great powers” can still be explored 
using this dataset, but with a much richer context for the region as a whole.  
These new methods for accounting for membership, representation, and selection allow 
for a new set of questions to be asked about when and how counties and municipalities arrange 
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their representational rights. The spectrum from municipally-dominant to county-dominant (and 
Types I-IV) introduced in this chapter demonstrates that there is substantial variation in which 
forms of local governments are permitted membership in a RIGO. How many representatives a 
member is entitled to seat, the constraints on who those representatives may be, and who has say 
in the selection process all give insight into the roles and relationships between and amongst 
municipalities and counties.  
Finally, these methods code the chamber or voting rules where the region itself has 
intentionally sought the most balance in demographic or population criteria. RIGOs provide 
executive committees and general assemblies with different powers and authorities. Relying on 
the most inclusive chamber, as much of the prior research has (Gerber & Gibson, 2009; Sanchez, 
2006; Wyman, 1994), does not identify chambers with a consistent set of powers. These methods 
do not remedy this concern, but this coding scheme does identify where the region’s local 
governments prioritize the most specific criteria for representation. Similarly, voting rules that 
balance demographic or population criteria may be rarely exercised in practice. However, the 
presence of these rules in governance documents may alter the policy recommendation and 
funding allocation proposals to garner consensus.  
3.6 Limitations of Coding Scheme 
While I am confident that the methods outlined in this chapter mitigates many of the 
methodological concerns outlined in Chapter 2, I have identified a few limitations. By relying on 
governing documents rather than rosters, I provide a much more complete picture of the formal 
roles and powers local governments have at their disposal within RIGOs than previous research. 
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However, there are a few identifiable blind spots that result from these methods. I outline three in 
this section: the inclusion of non-participants, informal governance, and anachronisms between 
bylaw updates and population totals. These limitations are the natural outcomes of my intentional 
choices to create rigor and consistency across inconsistent processes.  
I chose to include all eligible members within the geographic region to evaluate board 
structure, including some non-participants. First, a local government that chooses to exit or not 
participate in a RIGO may not be related to the governance of the board. These could include: 
member dues that local governments may wish not to pay, the local governments may have 
contentious relationships with neighbors, or have a voter base that prioritizes self-reliance. Non-
participation also presents in a few different, hard to quantify ways. Most obviously, it could be 
the absence of membership; not signing onto the founding documents or paying dues would be 
examples of this. However, non-participation could be more subtle, including frequent 
absenteeism from meetings or unconditional obstruction. These actions would not be reflected in 
a set of bylaws and may be a result of the choice in representative more than the feelings of the 
local government. Governance documents reflect the rules for playing the game, regardless of 
who chooses to play. An understanding of the full impact of how municipalities and counties 
share power across all eligible members may help identify when non-participation is more likely 
to occur because of the governance structures. This is covered in more detail in Chapter 4.  Non-
participation is a politically sensitive topic for RIGOs. While this research assists in our 
understanding of this tactic, more research is needed to fully understand causes for its 
occurrences. 
While governance documents represent the formal requirements and powers for 
members, the practice of decision-making may not always align. Boards may develop norms and 
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customs that augment or alter its practices without codifying them. The extent to which a board 
tables actions to seek out stronger consensus above and beyond than the simple required majority 
is one such example. Another informal governance practice may be unwritten expectations 
placed on representation in more exclusive chambers. One hypothetical involves an executive 
committee consisting of four officers and two at-large representatives with no geographic, 
demographic or political criteria. In an eight-county RIGO, the most populous county may 
continuously hold a seat on the executive committee longer than expected, purely because of a 
custom or norm or because the county has the collective voting power within the inclusive 
chamber to ensure it26. These concepts are not accounted for explicitly in the governance 
documents, and thus are not components of the research. Informal governance is another aspect 
of RIGOs where scholarship is opaque at best. Once again, we can look to colleagues like 
Randall Stone (2013) for models of how members act informally within International 
Organizations. 
Finally, there are some mild population anachronisms within the research. Throughout 
the research, 2010 Decennial Census populations were used for local government members and 
aggregated up to generate total RIGO populations. However, some RIGOs (and states) prescribe 
alternate sources or time frames to be used when tabulating local government representative 
seats or votes. Several RIGOs in Virginia are required to use population estimates from the 
Weldon Cooper Center for Public Service at the University of Virginia. In instances where 
sources other than the 2010 Census were prescribed for tabulation, representative and vote totals 
were compared with current rosters and mandated sources to ensure accuracy. As these 
                                                 
26 The converse could also be true where the smallest county holds a seat less often than expected because 
of custom or lack of voting power in the inclusive chamber. 
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documents were collected in 2017, there also may be some slight population shifts reflected in 
amendments to bylaws but not in populations. For example, two of the fastest growing RIGOs in 
the United States are the Lewis & Clark Regional Development Council (Bismarck, ND) and the 
Souris Basin Planning Council (Minot, ND). Both of these RIGOs updated bylaws in 2014; any 
changes to representation based on shifts in population since 2010 would remain unaccounted. 
However, the database includes five-digit ANSI county codes and seven- and ten-digit ANSI 
municipal codes. Therefore, the database can be merged with any other national population 
source following these standards for easy updating. 
This section has outlined the methods I have used to acquire and code bylaws and 
governance documents from 150 RIGOs. I have provided definitions for membership, 
representation, and selection to assist the reader and future researchers in distinguishing among 
highly interrelated concepts. Based on these definitions, I have outlined a spectrum of RIGOs 
from county-dominant to municipally-dominant within which there are four broad types. I have 
chosen to code the chambers and voting rules with the most variation on representation criteria 
such as population, geography or political structure. This decision was made because it finds the 
ways in which local governments have negotiated most visibly to protect their interests, either 
for decision-making or agenda-setting purposes. The database built from the coding of these 
bylaws is both a substantial upgrade from previous research and highly adaptive to future 
research questions. 
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3.7 Methods for Profiles of the Southcentral Michigan Planning Council and Sacramento 
Area Council of Governments 
The profiles presented in Chapter 5 explore alternative uses for the quantitative methods 
developed in Chapter 4. The Southcentral Michigan Planning Council (SMPC) chapter evaluates 
the region’s proposed collective choice arrangements at the inception of their organization. The 
profile of the Sacramento Area Council of Governments (SACOG) examines how changes in 
demographics and political structures over time can affect collective choice arrangements. These 
two profiles demonstrate that demographics and political structures are considered as part of the 
decision-making process for collective choice arrangements.  
The selection of SMPC is based on its relatively recent formation and the insights of a 
genesis story. SMPC’s current incarnation was formed in 2012 and much of the documentation 
from those initial meetings was readily available. The RIGO is relatively near the average in its 
IMS and PPS values (see Figure 5); thus, this example would be considered typical (Seawright & 
Gerring, 2008). As a result, this chapter explores the origins of the board structure to show that 
demographics and political structure are considered as part of a RIGO’s collective choice 
arrangements. 
SACOG currently has a unique set of collective choice arrangements among RIGOs in 
the sample that explicitly accounts for demographics and political structures. This region 
experienced a population boom from 1960-2010 that had two major relevant impacts to 
SACOG’s collective choice arrangements: (1) fluctuations in the disparity among local 
government populations and (2) the incorporation of several new municipalities. SACOG now 
uses a triple-testing method to adopt policy that requires majorities of municipalities, counties, 
and population. As a result, SACOG sits apart the upper-right corner of Figure 5 apart from most 
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other RIGOs. This innovative governance structure makes it a deviant example (Seawright & 
Gerring, 2008), in this case to demonstrate an extreme example of strong population 
proportionality and strong institutional membership. This profile quantifies changes in the 
environment and SACOG’s adaptation of its collective choice arrangements. 
These profiles are triangulated from a variety of sources internal and external to the 
organization. SMPC and SACOG each provided historical records of meeting minutes and 
related documentation that informed the decision. This documentation was supplemented by 
external media reports, policy papers, census data, and additional publicly available materials. I 
also conducted interviews with elected and appointed officials from both SMPC and SACOG. 
These elite interviews were conducted primarily to “corroborate what has been established from 
other sources” (Tansey, 2007, pg. 766).  
These interviews are exempt under IRB requirements (45 CFR 46.101(b)) both because 
they involve elected and appointed officials operating in this capacity (see 3.i) and the research 
project was approved by the RIGO executive director to examine a public program (see 5.i-iv). 
For the interviews, I prioritized the candor and comfort of the participants. Extensive notes were 
taken during each interview, but subjects were not recorded. Two interviews were conducted in 
person, one respondent replied to questions by email, and all others were conducted by 
telephone. The information provided by respondents is stored online with password protection. 
In-person and telephone respondents verbally consented to giving information to me as 
background; the e-mail respondent was informed of this by e-mail. When I use quotations with 
attribution or anecdotes that include easily identifiable information, I received their permission 
prior to publication.   
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Chapter 5 makes narrow claims and has substantial limitations in generalizability. Cases 
were selected on the IMS and PPS scores (of Figure 5) to demonstrate different applications the 
methods used. These profiles are not intended to be compared with one another or identify causal 
mechanisms. Governance documents are the product of a multitude of macro-level factors like 
state legislation or the policy areas a region’s local governments undertakes; but it is also the 
product of individual factors like the negotiation skills of representatives. Explicating all these 
factors, their interactions among one another, and their impact on the governance documents is 
beyond the scope of this research question. For the above reasons, I eschew the term case study, 
particularly in the Yin (2014) usage. I refer to these as profiles to reflect their limited explanatory 
power and generalizability. 
3.8 Conclusion 
Taken in totality, these methods provide a pathway to a new set of initial insights into the 
national picture, the origin story, and the adaptation of RIGO collective choice arrangements. 
Creating the compendium of existing operating governance documents from RIGOs across the 
country is a substantial contribution on its own, as it now allows for a wealth of exciting research 
beyond the research in this dissertation. The bylaws and other governance documents themselves 
provide some of the most unambiguous records of how RIGOs are to operate. 
I code these governance documents using the local government member as the unit of 
analysis to create a composite picture of the RIGO. This shift in methods alone shows how 
varied and complex collective choice arrangements are. Membership is far from uniform, with 
RIGOs providing membership to municipalities and counties in a variety of combinations and 
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forms. RIGOs also may have multiple chambers or specialized voting rules written into their 
governance documents. Furthermore, the selection process for representatives is not always 
solely at the discretion of the member local government. As a result, my evaluation of the “one-
member, one-vote” conventional wisdom provides more specification than has been done to date.  
The profiles of Southcentral Michigan Planning Council (SMPC) and the Sacramento 
Area Council of Governments (SACOG) use multiple methods including document analysis, 
census data and elite interviews to apply the concepts presented. The SMPC profile demonstrates 
how the definitions presented in this chapter and the formulas presented in Chapter 4 can be 
applied to compare collective choice arrangement proposals. The SACOG profile shows how 
these definitions and methods can be applied across time to show adaptation to the environment 
in which RIGOs operate. These are limited, precise questions intended to demonstrate the 
additional value of the methods presented in the dissertation.  
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4.0 Quantitative Findings 
In this chapter, I demonstrate that much of the literature has mischaracterized cross-
boundary intergovernmental organizations as overly structured as one-member, one-vote 
organizations. The findings presented here show that relatively few RIGOs are so structured; 
furthermore, the overwhelming majority of RIGOs make intentional efforts to balance population 
proportionality to at least some degree. I introduce a formula for calculating institutional 
membership and modify an existing formula to better measure population proportionality in 
RIGOs. I build a two-dimensional scatterplot that contrasts institutional membership to 
population proportionality that more clearly represents these board structures. In addition to 
looking at the sample in the whole, I evaluate those RIGOs containing cities of more than 
200,000 people (“great powers”) to determine if large cities are fundamentally different from the 
overall population. Finally, I analyze constraints on who can represent local governments and 
who can select these representatives in the context of its implications for the regional governance 
literature.   
 
4.1 Building a Two-Dimensional View of RIGOs 
Unlike the previous scholarship on cross-boundary intergovernmental organizations, my 
research evaluates RIGOs' board structures on two variables simultaneously: institutional 
membership and population proportionality. The prior literature has almost exclusively only 
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focused on one variable to measure their structure: the extent to which boards are one-member, 
one-vote (Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, 1973; Benjamin, Kincaid, & 
McDowell, 1994; Hall, 2009; Mogulof, 1971; Wyman, 1994; Zimmermann, 2011) or their 
population proportionality (Lewis & Sprague, 1997). By coding original governance documents 
by general-purpose local government and collecting their populations, I can develop a much 
more comprehensive picture of how governance documents provide representational rights to 
local government members. This section introduces a new formula for calculating the 
Institutional Membership Score (IMS) for any cross-boundary intergovernmental organization. 
Furthermore, it modifies the Taagepera & Shugart (1989) Deviation Index (D) to conform to a 
nationwide application; this is referred to as the Population Proportionality Score (PPS). Finally, 
the results of both the IMS and PPS are plotted to demonstrate the tremendous variation. This 
visual representation simultaneously reflects two crucial ways international organizations are 
perceived to provide representational rights: institutional membership (one-member, one-vote) 
and population proportionality (Kirsch & Langner, 2011; Posner & Sykes, 2014; Woodward, 
2007). Two major findings emerge from this scatter plot: (1) the presence of one-member, one-
vote of RIGOs is vastly overestimated in the academic literature, and (2) being one-member, 
one-vote can mean vastly different levels of population proportionality. 
4.1.1  Institutional Membership Score (IMS) 
The Institutional Membership Score (IMS) is a way of measuring the extent to which a 
RIGO honors the autonomy of its local governments and gives them decision-making authority 
as a function of its membership on the board. It is calculated by taking the lowest number of 
votes provided to any general-purpose local government, multiplied by the number of those local 
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government members; then that number is divided by the total number of votes of all the general-
purpose local governments27. As a result, the IMS falls between zero and one. A score of one 
indicates that all the members are entitled to an equal number of votes28; a score of zero is 
impossible but represents a useful abstract terminus. Figure 3 displays the formula for IMS: 
 
 
 
Throughout the 143 RIGOs sampled with complete governance information, the mean 
IMS was 0.79329. Only 60 RIGOs (41.96%) had perfect scores of 1. Using a 90% Bernoulli 
confidence interval, we can estimate that only 35.2-48.8% of RIGOs throughout the United 
                                                 
27 When a RIGO's bylaws require multiple majorities based on both institutional membership and 
population to ratify policy, the IMS is coded as 1.  Multi-jurisdictional members are treated collectively, not 
individually. 
28 This may or may not mean that all the local governments in that region are entitled to an equal number of 
votes. For example, a RIGO may provide collective representational rights to multiple jurisdictions. As a result, the 
member may receive an equal number of votes but may be representing multiple local governments.  
29 RIGOs that require multiple majorities were removed to be consistent with the survey methods of the 
other authors in Table 3. 
Figure 3 Formula for Institutional Membership Score 
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States have perfect one-member, one-vote structures30.  Table 3 compares the previous survey-
based scholarship of similar regional bodies to this research: 
 
Table 3 ACIR, Wyman, and Rickabaugh Results 
Author Year Population 
Studied 
% of Bodies with 1-
Member, 1-Vote 
Method 
ACIR 1973 Regional Councils 50 Survey 
Wyman 1994 Regional Councils 60 Survey 
Rickabaugh 2018 RIGOs 41.96% Coded Governance Documents 
 
 
This is an important contribution to the literature, even though the magnitude is not 
particularly striking. Its importance lies in our improved definition of membership that 
recognizes all local governments within a region may not be eligible for membership, 
membership can be multijurisdictional, and that RIGOs may provide representational rights 
differently depending on voting rules or chambers. Furthermore, unlike ACIR and Wyman, my 
research uses the most current governance documents, rather than surveys. As a result, there are 
no biases in the self-reporting of data.  
Therefore, measuring how close a RIGO’s collective choice arrangements are to “one-
member, one-vote” (through a measure like the IMS) is not sufficient by itself to express the 
ways in which general-purpose local governments have apportioned decision-making authority 
amongst themselves. A region in which all the counties have roughly the same population can 
operate on a one-member, one-vote basis without needing to worry about disproportionality 
concerns of members. However, most regions have local governments with significantly more 
                                                 
30 Including the RIGOs that require multiple majorities increase the percentage of one-member, one-vote 
bodies to 43.92%. The 90% Bernoulli confidence interval is then from 37.2-50.6%. 
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disparity in population. Hence, I present a second measure to best represent the fundamental 
tensions in collective choice arrangements.  
4.1.2  Population Proportionality Score (PPS) 
The Population Proportionality Score (PPS) makes some minor revisions to Taagepera & 
Shugart’s (1989) Deviation Index (D) so it conforms more directly to a national survey of 
regional councils and aligns logically with the IMS for logical visualization. The original 
formula for D is:  
 
 
 
Figure 4 Taagepera & Shugart's Deviation Index (1989) 
 
The Deviation Index aggregates the absolute difference between the percentage of seats 
on the board and the percentage of population within the organization. The resulting values all 
fall between zero and one. In the original Deviation Index, one indicated perfect 
disproportionality and zero indicated perfect proportionality.  
The PPS makes two major modifications to the Deviation Index as applied to cross-
boundary intergovernmental organizations31. Unlike Lewis & Sprague's (1997) application to 
                                                 
31 When a RIGO's bylaws require multiple majorities based on both institutional membership and 
population to ratify policy, the PPS is also coded as 1.  
D =
1
2
| si - pi |å
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MPOs in California, those organizations were either single county bodies with only municipal 
members (see: San Diego or Kern [Bakersfield] Counties) or they were multiple county bodies 
with only counties as members (see: Los Angeles region or Bay Area region). As a result, they 
did not need to concern themselves with the issue of nested representation when municipalities 
and their respective counties are simultaneously provided membership. However, in a national 
survey of RIGOs this nested membership concern is quite common. Barbour (2015) nests 
municipalities within the counties to which they belong in her evaluation of MPOs. Because one 
of the major purposes of the research is to evaluate the effects on center cities, this method 
cannot be used. Furthermore, the difference between a county and municipalities’ powers and 
interests likely leads to different objectives within a RIGO agenda.  As a result, the PPS formula 
intentionally double counts these populations. The other modification to Taagepera and Shugart's 
D in the PPS is that it is reflected. Therefore, this makes a perfect PPS of one reflective of a 
RIGO that is entirely population proportional (one-person, one-vote). Just like with the IMS, a 
score of zero is also impossible but is still a useful abstract terminus for conceptual purposes. 
Among the RIGOs randomly sampled, the mean PPS was .64332. The only RIGOs with 
perfect PPS scores of one were those that use dual testing procedures. However, 76 RIGOs have 
scores of .66 or higher, indicating that these bodies do pay strong attention to population 
proportionality. However just as before, PPS alone is also not sufficient to best understand these 
                                                 
32 This value does include RIGOs where multiple majorities are required to ratify policy, since there was no 
prior consistent survey to reflect this variable. While the IMS can be interpreted as a percentage of seats on a board 
provided through institutional membership, the formula for PPS is different and cannot be interpreted as a 
percentage. 
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bodies' collective choice arrangements. Plotting both the IMS and PPS together gives a much 
stronger overall perspective than either does individually. 
4.1.3  Visually Combining IMS and PPS 
Figure 5 shows how RIGO board structures can be best understood by combining the 
IMS and PPS. The scatterplot shows a fairly strong diagonal line above which RIGOs all have 
structured their boards according to institutional membership, population proportionality, or 
some combination of both. The absence of RIGOs in the lower-left quadrant is also a strong 
indication that these two variables together explain much of the variation in these collective 
choice arrangements. This is confirmed by much of the language included in many governance 
documents that prescribes additional votes above given population thresholds, collective 
representation for smaller local governments, or provides for a mandatory minimum number of 
votes for any member. Furthermore, this scatterplot is consistent with the ways in which 
International Organizations such as the European Union have structured their voting rules to 
reflect both the sovereignty of national governments and the relative population differences 
under the Treaty of Lisbon. These appear to be two key components that explain how votes are 
apportioned33. 
 
 
                                                 
33 The only notable exception to this within the random sample is the Franklin Regional Council of 
Governments (Greenfield, MA) described in Chapter 3 that uses a combination of institutional membership, 
population and total assessed value of the municipalities to weight voting on questions of appropriations. 
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The scatterplot also has been color coded to identify patterns among membership types as 
outlined in Chapter 3. Type IV RIGOs (Municipalities Only) strongly tend towards high IMS 
scores, regardless of their PPS. These RIGOs are concentrated in states where counties have the 
weakest powers (three New England states and Alaska) and largely are operating in regions 
Figure 5 IMS and PPS Results for 150 RIGOs in Sample (Coded by Type) 
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where population disparities are minimal. Type I and Type III RIGOs do not have any substantial 
trend by visual inspection.  
Type II RIGOs appear to have lower IMS scores, regardless of their PPS. Given that 
these RIGOs permit some municipalities to be members but not all, these regions are more likely 
to have at least one large municipality relative to the total population of the RIGO. I discuss large 
cities (in the absolute sense) in detail later in the chapter, but the size of local governments is 
important relative to the total population as well. The Black Hills Council of Governments 
(BHCOG) in South Dakota serves just over 180,000 citizens; Rapid City is more than six times 
larger than the next largest municipality in the region. Rapid City’s county (Pennington) has 
more than half the RIGO population. BHCOG is a Type II RIGO: all counties are members, but 
municipalities must have a population of more than 1,000 to be eligible. Both municipal and 
county members are entitled to one representative and an additional representative for every 
additional 10,000 in population. As a result, Pennington County and Rapid City collectively hold 
eighteen of the forty-three seats on the BHCOG board. Harding County has no municipalities 
above 1,000 people, and as a result, only has one representative. BHCOG has an IMS of .488. 
The upper-left quadrant is composed of RIGOs with strong Institutional Membership 
Scores and weak Population Proportionality Scores. The Beartooth Resource Conservation and 
Development Area in southern central Montana provides each local government member (five 
counties and 12 incorporated municipalities, Type III) with one representative to its Board of 
Directors. Despite not being a large RIGO by population (2010 population: 183,683), this region 
also has substantial disparities among members’ population. The city of Billings comprises 
56.7% of the membership’s population; Yellowstone County (which includes Billings) 
comprises more than 80% of the membership’s population. Meanwhile, Sweet Grass County 
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receives an equal number of representatives to the board with less than 2% of the population, as 
does its county seat, Big Timber, with less than 1% of the population. This organization appears 
to typify the concerns of scholars who worry about the under-representation of cities at the 
expense of suburban and rural concerns, but that takes too narrow a view. The organization has 
self-identified as being concerned with more than just development; it also focuses on protecting 
natural resources, most of which are found in less urban areas. Thus, this RIGO’s one-member, 
one-vote structure may reflect a different kind of balance between urban, suburban, and rural 
areas because of its mission. 
The lower-right quadrant is composed of RIGOs with weak Institutional Membership 
Scores and strong Population Proportionality Scores. The Northeast Ohio Four County Regional 
Planning and Development Organization serves the Akron-Canton area. Each county is entitled 
to four representatives, with an additional three representatives for each 100,000 or fraction 
thereof. The largest municipality in each county is entitled to one representative; but if a 
municipality has more than 100,000 people, they follow the guidelines of counties. As a result, 
the cities of Wooster, Canton, and Kent (all under 100,000 people) each have one representative 
out of the total 40 local government representatives. Meanwhile, the city of Akron (2010 
population: 199,110) has seven representatives. Summit County (including Akron) has more than 
500,000 people, meaning it has 16 of the 40 representatives (plus Akron’s seven, meaning they 
have a majority). As a result of these additional thresholds for representation, the population 
proportionality is quite strong at .739. Because the smaller cities are entitled to one 
representative each and there are eight total members (four counties and their largest cities), the 
IMS is calculated at .2 [.2 = ((1*8)/40)]. 
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The upper-right quadrant is composed of RIGOs with both strong Institutional 
Membership Scores and Population Proportionality Scores. The Rockingham Planning 
Commission serves twenty-seven municipalities and Rockingham County in southeastern New 
Hampshire. This region includes many of the northern suburbs in the Boston-Cambridge-
Newton, MA-NH Metropolitan Statistical Area. Under New Hampshire state law, each 
municipality is entitled to two representatives regardless of size. Three representatives are 
provided for municipalities between 10,000-25,000 and four representatives for municipalities 
above 25,000 (NH Rev Stat § 36:48 (2015)). As of the 2010 Census, the region has one city of 
more than 25,000; Salem had 28,776 people at that time. Four cities had populations between 
10,000-25,000 (Exeter, Hampton, Portsmouth, and Raymond). As a result, representation here 
results in strong scores on both the IMS (.903) and the PPS (.753). 
This same state law has dramatically different impacts throughout the state, based on the 
way boundaries are drawn and the distribution of populations. Table 4 demonstrates this for the 
four New Hampshire RIGOs included in the random sample.  
 
 
Table 4 New Hampshire RIGOs in Random Sample 
RIGO Name # of 
Munis 
Largest 
Muni 
Largest 
Muni 
Population 
# of 
Counties 
IMS PPS 
Rockingham  27 Salem 28,776 1 .903 .753 
Central NH  20 Concord 42,695 2 .957 .703 
Southern NH  15 Manchester 109,565 3 .783 .689 
North 
Country  
51 Conway 10,115 3 .982 .366 
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The Central New Hampshire Regional Planning Commission is similar to Rockingham; 
the IMS is higher because there are fewer overall members and Concord is the only member 
entitled to more than two representatives. Concord has more people than Salem but is still only 
entitled to the maximum of four representatives; therefore that region is more population 
disproportional than Rockingham. Southern New Hampshire sees a substantial drop in IMS 
because eight of the fifteen members are entitled to three or more representatives (Manchester 
and its suburbs). Despite providing more representatives to municipalities with higher 
populations, the PPS is lower than the prior two RIGOs. This is in part because Manchester has 
nearly 40% of the region’s population but less than 10% of the votes on the planning 
commission. The boundaries of the Southern New Hampshire RPC are drawn quite tightly, but 
the opposite is true in the North Country Council. This heavily rural region of the state includes 
three counties and more than fifty municipalities. Only two municipalities are entitled to more 
than two representatives, leading to the most heavily one-member, one-vote structure. Twenty-
seven municipalities in this region have less than 1,000 people. These municipalities have the 
same representation as municipalities with 5,000-10,000 people, despite having at least five 
times lower population. In summary, the New Hampshire state law enforces a consistent 
governance selection process across all of its Regional Planning Commissions, but the drawing 
of those boundaries and the population disparities result in drastically different structures for 
decision-making. 
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4.2 RIGOs Containing Large Cities 
While the previous section focused on RIGOs overall, Chapter 2 discusses extensively 
the concerns scholars have expressed about the decision-making authority provided to urban 
areas on boards in cross-boundary intergovernmental organizations like RIGOs. These scholars 
believe urban areas are under-represented on these boards, echoing the previously-discounted 
"one-member, one-vote" myth. However, it remains possible that RIGOs with large cities could 
be significantly different from RIGOs writ large. To test these ideas, I restrict the original 
random sample to just those RIGOs with at least one city with a 2010 Census Population of at 
least 200,000. Twenty-seven RIGOs met these criteria. The resulting scatterplot of IMS and PPS 
scores is shown in Figure 6: 
 
Figure 6 RIGOs Containing Large Cities Plotted by IMS and PPS 
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A visual inspection of the scatter plot shows a roughly similar distribution of RIGOs to 
the overall population across both the IMS and PPS variables. The mean IMS for RIGOs with a 
large city is .779, compared to a mean IMS for RIGOs without a large city at .804. The mean 
PPS score for RIGOs with a large city is .686, compared to a mean PPS score for RIGOs without 
a large city at .634. These variables do not meet the normality assumption required to run a t-test 
to show differences between the RIGOs with and without large cities. They skew negative, 
which is logical considering zero is an unachievable abstract concept and one represents perfect 
representation (either by population or by membership). However, the standard deviation for 
each of these variables is quite substantial. This is a strong indication that RIGOs with large 
cities and without large cities are not fundamentally different from one another in the way they 
allocate voting privileges. However, given the strong focus of the literature on the under-
representation of large cities, the following section outlines some key features of the randomly 
selected RIGOs with large cities. 
As noted by Marker A, all four RIGOs with multiple testing voting rules in the original 
random sample contain cities of at least 200,000 people (San Diego/Chula Vista, Detroit, 
Sacramento, and Phoenix/Chandler/Scottsdale/Mesa). This is one clear indication that large cities 
have found creative ways to develop collective choice arrangements that balance the needs of 
urban cities and counties with smaller, suburban, or rural areas within the same region. Each of 
these RIGOs calculates their respective multiple majorities differently. Thus, if there has been 
policy diffusion with these methods, it has been adapted to meet each local context.  
Marker B points out the Northeastern Indiana Regional Coordinating Council (Fort 
Wayne); here state law provides more representation based on population but, counter to 
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intuition, it does not lead to a high PPS. This RIGO has a high IMS of .781, and a PPS of .392. 
As a result, it is in the quadrant over which scholars like Hall (2009, see quote on page 4) have 
expressed concern. This RIGO has four counties is structured as a Type II (Counties and Some 
Municipalities). Indiana state law (IC 36-7-7-4 [2016]) has prescribed a consistent board 
structure for all its Regional Planning Commissions that provides more representation based on 
population. While Indiana state law provides for additional representatives for counties with 
more than 50,000 people, it provides for representatives from more cities and minimally provides 
for multiple representatives from the largest cities. As a result, Fort Wayne (2010 population: 
253,691) has two representatives; meanwhile, Zanesville (2010 population: 600) is entitled to a 
representative. Additionally, Fort Wayne’s county, Allen County, is entitled to one additional 
representative because it meets the population threshold. The two local governments combined 
(Fort Wayne and Allen County) comprise 15.6% of the board. The remaining three counties 
comprise 22.7% of the population and hold 65.6% of the 42 seats34. For scholars who care about 
more population proportional representation, this represents a cautionary tale to ensure that 
thresholds are designed to promote more representation of larger cities, not just more 
representation of municipalities based on population. 
Marker C identifies Virginia's Richmond Regional Planning District Commission in the 
lower-right quadrant where population thresholds do lead to higher PPS. Virginia’s political 
structure is unique, relative to most other state environments for RIGOs, because it allows for 
some cities to operate independently of counties35 and the strong role of counties. In the 
Richmond Regional Planning District Commission, a municipality must have a population of at 
                                                 
34  Six additional municipalities within Allen County make up the remaining 18.8% difference. 
35  Only two other cases are present in the random sample: Baltimore and St. Louis.  
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least 3,501 to be eligible for membership. This is a Type II RIGO, because counties represent the 
unincorporated areas and municipalities with 3,500 or fewer people (not because of the special 
status of independent cities). Many RIGOs in Virginia have developed population thresholds to 
determine the number of representatives to which each local government is entitled. Most, 
including Richmond's RIGO, divide their representatives between elected officials and citizens 
appointed by the local government. Having a minimum population requirement for membership 
combined with thresholds for additional representation are fundamental reasons why this RIGO 
is in the lower-right quadrant. Figure 7 is a reprinting of Section 2 of the Richmond Regional 
Planning District’s charter that describes how this functions: 
 
Figure 7 Richmond Regional Planning District Commission Representation Thresholds36 
 
                                                 
36 Original document reprinted from “Charter Agreement of the Richmond Regional Planning District 
Commission”, 1990, available at: http://www.richmondregional.org/Publications/PDC/RRPDC_Charter.pdf 
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Single-county RIGOs with large cities retain high IMS across the board, but vary 
substantially on PPS. Kern Council of Governments (Bakersfield, CA) and Pima Association of 
Governments (Tucson, AZ) are both single-county RIGOs in the upper-left quadrant. 
Meanwhile, the Capital Regional Planning Commission (Madison, WI) and the San Diego 
Association of Governments are also single-county RIGOs with strong population 
proportionality. Because single county RIGOs are constituted primarily by municipalities37, the 
diversity between municipalities is usually more pronounced. There are no other counties to rival 
the large city in size. Table 5 highlights the difference in single county RIGOs: 
 
 
Table 5 Single County RIGOs Containing Large Cities 
RIGO Largest City Largest City % of 
RIGO Population 
IMS PPS 
Capital Area Regional Planning 
Commission 
Madison, WI 47.78% .923 .769 
Kern Council of Governments Bakersfield, 
CA 
41.39% .923 .371 
Pima Association of Governments Tucson, AZ 53.06% 1.000 .400 
San Diego Association of Governments San Diego, 
CA 
42.24% 1.000 1.000 
 
 
The findings of single-county RIGOs in their collective choice arrangements are simple 
examples of why we see a balance between institutional membership and population 
proportionality. This balance often leaves large cities short of a one-person, one-vote 
                                                 
37  Most single-county RIGOs have county representation on the board in a de facto at-large capacity.  
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membership structure. But these single-county RIGOs demonstrate why that is not a reasonable 
expectation. If a large city or county holds a majority or near majority of the population, it can 
easily dominate the agenda. Scholars like Hall (2009) and Orfield & Dawes (2016) may feel the 
urban areas should dominate the agenda, but this is not a recipe for a sustainable regional voice 
over the long term. This pattern is consistent with what we see in international organizations. 
Germany and France have relinquished power within the European Union to ensure that smaller 
countries have a significant enough voice to continue participation. The United States is 
substantially under-represented in the United Nations, relative to its contributions. To develop a 
legitimate, sustainable, multi-party organization among unequal members, the smaller players 
must retain enough power to prevent being overwhelmed. The previous two sections have 
focused on how many people each local government is provided in the bylaws; the next section 
looks at who those people are and who is permitted to select them.  
 
4.3 Constraints on Representation and Selection for Local Governments 
As outlined in Chapter 2, who represents these local governments on RIGO boards is a 
second key question for understanding the governance structure.  This representation is 
segregated into three questions: (1) Are local governments constrained in their selection of 
representatives? (2) When local governments are constrained in their selection process, which 
actors have named protected seats on the board? (3) When a local government representative is 
not named ex officio to the board, who has a say in the selection process? This section returns to 
evaluating the full 149 RIGOs with formalized governance documentation. Just as in the 
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previous sections, this research relies on cluster samples using the RIGO as the unit of analysis, 
and not the local government. 
 
4.3.1  Are Local Governments Constrained in Their Selection of Representatives? 
Representation of local government members is diverse within RIGO boards as well as 
across RIGO boards. As seen above in Figure 7 from the Richmond Regional Planning District 
Commission bylaws, populations determine the mix of citizens, elected officials and local 
planning commissioners named as representatives to the board. Thus, this mix will fluctuate 
within the region, but no locality has the decision to choose outside of these constraints. 
However, some RIGOs have no constraints at all on who can represent their constituent local 
governments. In the Franklin Regional Council of Governments (Greenfield, MA), the only 
requirement to be a representative of a local government is that “[representatives] shall be 
residents and registered voters of the towns from which they are appointed… [and] not be an 
employee of the Council.” (Franklin Regional Council of Governments Charter, 1997, pg. 4). 
The examples of the Richmond and Franklin regions represent two spectral opposite approaches 
to converting membership to representation, with a variety of regional board structures adopting 
strategies in between. However, there is no single, logically defensible ordinal ranking of these 
structures; a local government could be prescribed more or fewer elected officials, citizens, 
professional staff, or seats without constraint. As a result, I rely on a binary nominal 
operationalization to compare RIGOs that have board members with constraints to those that do 
not.  
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In all, 54 RIGOs have at least one member with at least one representative appointed 
without constraints. With a 95% Bernoulli Confidence Interval, this means that 28.3-43.7% of 
RIGOs overall will have at least one member with at least one representative appointed without 
constraints. To some extent, this appears to be a function of the structure of membership. Table 6 
disaggregates these frequencies by membership type: 
 
 
Table 6 RIGOs with at Least One Representative Appointed without Constraint by Membership Type 
 # of RIGOs with 1+ Rep. 
Appointed w/o Constraint 
RIGOs of This Type in 
the Sample 
% 
Type I (Counties Only) 6 19 31.6% 
Type II (Counties and Some Munis) 7 29 24.1% 
Type III (Counties and All Munis) 25 89 28.1% 
Type IV (Munis Only) 6 11 54.5% 
 
Most noticeable from the above table is how commonly appointments without constraints 
occur in Type IV RIGOs. These RIGOs are found exclusively in the New England states and 
Alaska where counties are weak or non-existent. Type IV RIGOs also frequently have the 
smallest populations with single jurisdiction membership. All other things being equal, 
constraints on who can serve impact smaller jurisdictions more severely. Giving these localities 
the flexibility to send the most qualified or capable person regardless of their role may be an 
important condition to consenting to collective choice arrangements. The small sample size of 
the overall total (n=11) makes it difficult to infer too much, but it is reasonable that this trend 
would be more common throughout Type IV RIGOs. This gives an indication of the flexibility 
local government members have across RIGOs, but tells us little about the variation within 
RIGOs. 
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RIGOs can constrain the selection of representatives for all, some, or no members within 
their bylaws. In almost 63% of RIGOs in the random sample, the bylaws strictly prescribe who is 
permitted to represent every local government member. They may have some latitude in which 
council member or which citizen is selected, but the role itself is firmly constrained. In almost 
17% of the RIGOs in the random sample, no local government is constrained in any way 
regarding who may represent it on the board of the RIGO. There may be agreements internal to 
the local government on these matters (e.g. a formal or informal agreement between council and 
the mayor), but they are not prescribed within the RIGO’s governance documents. In slightly 
more than 20% of the random sample of RIGOs, some local governments have constraints while 
others do not. No readily interpreted pattern occurs among those within the same RIGO that are 
under constraints from those that are not, but it represents an opportunity for future research.  
 
4.3.2  Which Actors Have Protected Seats on RIGO Boards? 
As stated earlier, it is difficult to create a logically defensible ordinal ranking of 
constraints on representation. This section aggregates the nominal categories of constraints 
across RIGOs to identify a composite picture of which actors have protected seats on RIGO 
boards. This section again uses a cluster analysis, averaging percentages of constraints from each 
RIGO so that a board size of 10 is treated equally to a board size of 30. Table 7 provides the 
results of this analysis across the ten categories coded for RIGOs in the random sample: 
 
Table 7 Average Composite RIGO Board by Form of Representation (n=150) 
Representative % of Representatives 
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County Ex Officio 7.70  
Municipal Ex Officio 11.36  
County Elected Representative 12.53  
Municipal Elected Representative 21.64  
County or Municipal Elected Representative 1.86  
TOTAL SEATS FOR ELECTED OFFICIALS38 55.09  
Local Government Employee  1.12 
Any Local Government Official (Elected or Employee)  6.32 
Citizens  5.83 
Other Representation  5.17 
No Constraints  26.47 
TOTAL 100% 
 
The two most noteworthy findings from these results are the strong presence of elected 
officials as RIGO board members and the relatively weak presence of local government 
professional staff. This puts RIGOs in a different place on the spectrum from a pure 
interpretation of Deil Wright’s Intergovernmental Relations (1990). It also runs counter to 
Frederickson’s (1999) conceptualization of administrative conjunction where elected officials 
rarely play a part. In part due to these frameworks, the overwhelming body of research on how 
local governments work across boundaries focuses on the role of professional staff like city 
managers. These findings indicate that some important facets of regional governance occur by 
the decisions of elected officials. As identified in Chapter 2, very little research has been done on 
how elected officials receive input and prioritize outcomes in the decisions they make on a RIGO 
board. Because the board represents collective principals that drive the agenda of their agents 
(RIGO professional staff), how these decisions come to be made is a crucial component of a 
better understanding of RIGOs (and cross-boundary intergovernmental organizations writ large). 
This is one highly promising avenue for future research.  
 
                                                 
38 Bernoulli 95% confidence interval for all elected officials: 47.1 - 63.1% 
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4.3.3  When a Local Government has Flexibility in its Representative, Who has Rights to 
Engage in that Selection? 
In the overwhelming majority of cases throughout the United States, local governments 
independently decide who will represent them within the constraints of the RIGO bylaws. In a 
few rare circumstances, actors external to that local government have a say, in part or wholly, as 
to who is selected as a representative. This section again uses cluster analysis but bifurcates 
county representatives from municipal representatives. Within the 137 RIGOs with county 
representatives, more than 90% of the time counties select independently. Twelve RIGOs have at 
least one county representative selected by the municipalities within that county and six RIGOs 
have at least one county representative selected jointly by the county and municipalities 
(including through IGOs or similar county-wide bodies). In eleven RIGOs, county 
representatives were selected some other way; this usually involved participation by the state’s 
governor or state legislators. Among the 111 RIGOs with municipal representatives, no more 
than two RIGOs had external selection mechanisms. These findings conform to theoretical 
expectations, but as the first such research using bylaws and governance documents still 
represent an important empirical contribution. 
 
4.4 Conclusion 
This chapter demonstrates that the structure of RIGO boards is substantially more 
complex than the literature to this point has concluded. By directly coding local government 
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members under the terms of the actual bylaws and governance documents, I show that the “one-
member, one-vote” structure the literature upheld as dominant for the last forty years is 
insufficient to describe this complexity. Furthermore, my research generates meaningful 
evidence that collective choice arrangements overwhelmingly honor population proportionality 
more than scholarship has previously acknowledged.  
This new approach counters the prior thread of research into regional governance that 
bemoaned a perceived imbalance in representation for urban governments. These findings show 
that the board structures of RIGOs with large urban cities look similar to those without. Using 
the Institutional Membership Score and Population Proportionality Scores in tandem shows there 
are relatively few RIGOs where large cities are overwhelmed on the board by a one-member, 
one-vote structure. However, a one-person, one-vote structure is similarly rare. Most boards 
balance these two factors to ensure that the city has a substantial enough presence to reflect its 
importance, but smaller players can retain some amount of collective veto power. This is an 
approach similar to how international organizations like the European Union or UN Security 
Council operate. 
Constraints on who can represent local governments on RIGO boards identifies a new 
gap in the literature on the mechanisms of regional governance. While the bulk of scholarship 
has looked at the roles professional staff such as city managers play in processes like interlocal 
agreements, my research shows that elected officials have a much more key role within RIGO 
boards. We currently know very little about what drives the decision-making processes of elected 
officials in a regional governance context, so this represents a fruitful path for future research. 
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5.0 Chapter 5: Alternate Uses of IMS & PPS  
Histories abound on the formation of international organizations like the European 
Union, United Nations, World Bank, and International Monetary Fund (Dinan, 2004; El-Agraa, 
1998; Schild, 1995) and the ways in which they have evolved over time. Archivists have 
protected the documents that reflect the various points of negotiation and proposals for 
compromise; these are publicly accessible for future historians.  Rich explorations of the details 
of these organizations’ geneses continue to generate new insights into how supranational 
institutions developed their governance and, in particular, the collective choice arrangements.  
Furthermore, the international organizations literature regularly recognizes that collective 
choice arrangements evolve to meet members’ needs and reflect policy agendas that expand and 
contract (Posner & Sykes, 2014; Vestergaard & Wade, 2013; Woodward, 2007). The expansion 
of the European Coal and Steel Community from six countries at its founding, grew to become 
the European Economic Community, and eventually becoming the European Union. This 
expanded membership, policy agenda, and collective choice arrangements through the Treaty of 
Rome (1957), the Single European Act (1986), the Maastricht Treaty (1993), the Treaty of 
Amsterdam (1999), the Treaty of Nice (2003), and the Treaty of Lisbon (2009). These are 
documents that codify the negotiations and assent of these nation’s leaders. Koremenos, Lipson, 
& Snidal (2001) argue: “Although we do not argue that all institutional change is the product of 
conscious design, we do consider it the overriding mechanism guiding the development of 
international institutions” (pg. 766-767). The genesis stories of RIGOs, particularly those from 
the 1960s and 1970s, and their evolutions since then, have not been systematically documented 
in any similar way.  
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A substantial consequence of the “one-member, one-vote” refrain that dominates the 
scholarship evaluating cross-boundary intergovernmental organization is that a local 
government’s representational rights are viewed as static, regardless of how the organization 
may change, how state legislation affecting these bodies may be altered, how membership 
changes, and how the municipalities and counties within the region may change over time. Given 
all of these possibilities for how governance needs may shift, it seems highly implausible that 
these governance documents are cast in stone. Of the 142 RIGOs with dated governance 
documents in the sample, more than eighty have made revisions or amendments to these 
documents in the past ten years; many of these documents list the many multiple dates on which 
amendments were adopted. These changes may not have directly affected local governments’ 
representational rights, but it is a solid indicator that the governance of RIGOs is far from static. 
Evaluation is scarce as to how collective choice arrangements evolve within American cross-
boundary intergovernmental organizations to meet members’ needs and reflect changing policy 
agendas39. 
This chapter demonstrates that the method developed to calculate IMS and PPS values 
outlined in Chapter 4 further can be used within a single organization both to evaluate proposals 
and trace the evolution of collective choice arrangements over an organization’s history. This 
chapter profiles two RIGOs: the Southcentral Michigan Planning Council (Kalamazoo/Battle 
Creek, MI) and the Sacramento Area Council of Governments (CA). The Southcentral Michigan 
Planning Council (SMPC) re-launched itself in 2012 from scratch and retained the proposals it 
considered for its initial collective choice arrangements. In this chapter, I present how the IMS 
                                                 
39 The closest examination of these issues is the ACIR (1973) discussion of the Northeast Ohio Areawide 
Coordinating Agency (Cleveland, OH).  
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and PPS can be used to evaluate these proposals. The Sacramento Area Council of Governments 
(SACOG) saw rapid and uneven population growth and shifts in which local government 
membership since its formation in the 1960s. The evolution of SACOG’s collective choice 
arrangements reflects these changes in their IMS and PPS values over time. 
I supplement both of these profiles with background information on the regions and the 
organizations using meeting minutes and documentation, interviews with elected and appointed 
officials from the region, and other publicly available documentation. This chapter focuses on 
alternative applications of the IMS and PPS; these chapters are not intended to be a history of 
how the RIGOs decided upon collective choice arrangements. In each section, I begin by 
providing some background information on the region in which each RIGO operates. Then, I use 
original documentation to demonstrate the applicability of the IMS and PPS. 
5.1 Southcentral Michigan Planning Council 
The State of Michigan groups together Barry, Branch, Calhoun, Kalamazoo and St. 
Joseph Counties as the State Planning and Development Region 3 (SPDR). Governor George 
Romney issued Executive Directive 1968-1 that organized the state into (after amendments) 14 
state-designated planning and development regions (SPDRs). The 1968 Executive Directive did 
not put in place provisions for governance of the region by local governments; these were 
boundaries identified by the state for the implementation of state functions.  However, SPDRs 
have often, but not always, coincided with regional collaboration efforts over time. I use this 
particular regional definition because it reflects one of the key ways the state allocates resources 
to Michigan regions; these original five counties formed the original SMPC. 
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The two major cities of SMPC are Kalamazoo and Battle Creek. Kalamazoo is the 
primary city of a two-county MSA with its contiguous western county, Van Buren40. Battle 
Creek is the primary city of a single county (Calhoun) MSA. As of 2010, the five-county region 
had a population of around 550,000. This population puts it in the top third of RIGOs 
nationwide. Kalamazoo County is roughly twice the population of Calhoun County; however, 
Calhoun County is at least twice as populous as the remaining three counties individually. As a 
result, the region is not entirely built around one major city (Process A region) nor is it built on 
multiple relatively equal powers (Process B region41).  
Like several other Midwestern states, Michigan divides local government into counties, 
municipalities, and townships. There are five counties, forty municipalities, and eighty-five 
townships throughout the original five counties of SMPC. These local governments are quite 
evenly balanced across the five counties, even though populations are not (see Table 8). 
Michigan is a strong home-rule state, so municipalities and townships have substantial authority 
within their jurisdiction. 
 
 
Table 8 Municipalities and Townships by County within Original SMPC Members 
County Cities Villages Townships 2010 Population 
Barry 5 4 19 59,173 
Branch 2 3 16 45,248 
Calhoun42 4 5 19 136,146 
                                                 
40 Van Buren County is a member of the Southwest Michigan Planning Commission (Niles/Benton 
Harbor). 
41 Defined in Chapter 2, see pages 41-43. 
42 Does not include Huron Potawatomi native government. 
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Kalamazoo 4 5 15 250,331 
St. Joseph 2 6 16 61,295 
 
5.1.1  The Struggling Regional Initiatives of Southcentral Michigan 
The five-county region of Southcentral Michigan has struggled to build and sustain 
regional organizations. Visser’s (2004) comparative case study article compared the faltering 
Kalamazoo County Council of Governments (KCCOG) to the thriving Grand Valley 
Metropolitan Council. Most notably to this research, Visser identifies that a proposed 
proportional voting structure of KCCOG exacerbated divisions between the city and smaller 
municipalities and townships. This conflict was resolved eventually, but mistrust persisted 
(Visser, 2004). By the early 2000s, KCCOG was dormant; the organization revived itself and 
focuses on sharing best practices (Klug, 2012). 
In 2014, four local governments and Western Michigan University formed the 
Kalamazoo County Consolidated Dispatch Authority (KCCDA). This interlocal agreement was 
designed to eventually create a single 911 call center for the county. In 2017, a referendum to 
increase surcharges on phone lines by $2.30 per month to pay for this consolidation was defeated 
(Barrett, 2017a). The county’s union of police officers, the Kalamazoo Fraternal Order of Police, 
publicly opposed both the consolidation and the referendum (Barrett, 2017b). In May 2018, 
KCCDA received a state grant of almost $2 million to assist in the capital costs of consolidation 
(Devereaux, 2018).  
The five original counties were the members of the prior incarnation of SMPC. The 
original version of SMPC was formed in 1973 and served as a federal Economic Development 
District (EDD) and a state-designated Regional Planning Commission that oversaw rural 
 108 
transportation planning43 with the state’s Department of Transportation. By the early 2000s, the 
prior SMPC stopped servicing the member counties. Eventually, its federal certification as an 
EDD lapsed and member local governments no longer acknowledged the prior incarnation of 
SMPC. The current incarnation of SMPC has no records or information related to the prior 
SMPC. Legal constraints limit the amount of information that can be shared about its dissolution.  
5.1.2  The Curious Case of Barry County 
After the 2010 Census, Barry County was classified with the Grand Rapids MSA (north 
and west of Barry County). At that time, there was no viable Regional Planning Commission in 
place in SPDR 3 and Barry County began to see itself as more aligned with the Grand Rapids 
region. Because the State of Michigan still classified it with SPDR 3, Barry County joined 
SMPC at its formation in 2012. By late 2013, Barry County had arranged to leave SMPC and 
join the West Michigan Regional Planning Commission (not a RIGO) that includes Grand 
Rapids. To date, the state has not updated its SPDR boundaries. As a result Barry County still 
receives transportation planning through SPDR 3 and the new SMPC, but holds no seats on the 
board. Municipalities in Barry County (but not the county government) have also joined the 
Grand Valley Metro Council, a separate RIGO that serves different functions for the Grand 
Rapids area. As a result, the profile of the region refers to five counties at the inception of 
SMPC, but contains only four counties currently. 
                                                 
43 Both the Kalamazoo and Battle Creek urbanized areas have MPOs that function independently of the 
SMPC. 
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5.1.3  The Re-Formation of SMPC and the Proposals for Collective Choice Arrangements 
The State of Michigan developed several pieces of enabling legislation to facilitate 
regional governance that minimally constrain the collective choice arrangements. When taken 
together, the legislation creates a complicated landscape of possibilities for cooperating local 
governments to navigate (Michigan Association of Planning Law Committee, 2011)44. SMPC 
was reformed in 2012 under Public Act 281 of 1945 that allows any local government units 
(including counties, municipalities, and townships) to form regional planning commissions. This 
legislation did not prescribe a governance structure but prohibited these commissions from 
excluding county board supervisor involvement on the board (MI Comp L § 125.12 [2017]).  
Lee Adams, the current Executive Director of SMPC, was tasked with trying to re-build 
SMPC. Mr. Adams started his career working for Kalamazoo County with the Brownfield 
Redevelopment Authority. However, as the county saw the importance of revitalizing SMPC, 
they tasked Mr. Adams with restarting the organization. Mr. Adams was able to provide me the 
original documentation he used to compare the initial collective choice arrangement proposals. 
This was sent to me in an Excel document with six worksheets that evaluated a variety of 
demographic and political structure issues. Mr. Adams invented these options himself, having 
done prior research as an undergraduate in collective choice arrangements. He also relied on 
nearby Regional Planning Commissions as models, representing potential policy diffusion 
(Shipan & Volden, 2008). These options are reprinted from Mr. Adams’s initial Excel document 
in Figure 8. Mr. Adams presents in the lower-right corner of the figure what proportions of civic 
                                                 
44 This 2011 report developed model legislation that would simplify the structures of regional cooperation. 
As of this writing, the legislation has not been enacted. 
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and private sector representation would be needed to comply with EDA regulations so that 
SMPC can regain its certification as an Economic Development District.  
The re-formation of SMPC follows Keohane’s pre-conditions of a limited number of 
players, existing patterns that build confidence, and shared interests (Keohane, 1984). 
Municipalities and townships were not considered to be initial members of SMPC, making the 
organization a Type I RIGO. Mr. Adams said that keeping the number of initial players small 
made the re-organization more manageable. He also acknowledged a lack of trust among some 
municipalities and townships towards collaboration. There is currently discussion about opening 
up membership or representation to municipalities and townships. As SMPC has demonstrated 
successes, there is more interest in municipal and township participation (Lee Adams, Personal 
Communication; May 1, 2018). 
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Figure 8 Original County Representation Excel Worksheet Designed by Lee Adams45 
 
  
                                                 
45 Provided by personal correspondence; June 8, 2017.  
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In the original documentation, the SMPC alternatives built a similar measure of 
population proportionality to the PPS. Mr. Adams was entirely unaware of the Taagepera & 
Shugart (1989) Deviation Index (D) that is the basis of the PPS (Lee Adams, Personal 
Communication; May 1, 2018). Despite that, Mr. Adams calculated the absolute differences 
between each county’s percentage of seats on the board and the county’s percentage of 
population within SMPC. More remarkably, he aggregated those absolute differences to give a 
blunt, but still highly meaningful, value akin to the PPS46. Mr. Adams also calculated each 
option’s number of residents per representative. While Option A is the “one-member, one-vote” 
alternative, no similar calculation is done for IMS. 
In Table 9, I have calculated both the IMS and PPS values for the seven alternatives. The 
table provides the same descriptions as Figure 8 and includes the percentage of votes provided to 
the “great power” of the region, Kalamazoo County.  Mr. Adams recommended, and the SMPC 
interim board adopted, Option B. Under that proposal, the smaller counties are over-represented 
relative to their population to ensure SMPC more truly reflects the voice of the region. During 
our conversation, Mr. Adams acknowledged it was not the most representative by population, but 
he said it was politically feasible. He said he thought that was the best option because it “ensured 
the smaller counties had a strong enough voice and prevented Kalamazoo County from 
dominating the board.” (Lee Adams, Interview, May 1, 2018).  
 
                                                 
46 Mr. Adams’s method is blunt in that it works well for comparing collective choice arrangements for a 
RIGO with a consistent set of members (his intended purpose), but would lose validity comparing across multiple 
RIGOs with different numbers of members. 
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Table 9 Alternative Board Structures Initially Considered by SMPC 
Option Description (from Excel) IMS PPS 
% of Votes for 
Kalamazoo County 
A 
Each county receives the same 
number of representatives 
1.000 0.700 20.00 
B 
(Recommended 
and Adopted) 
Base of two [representatives], 
one additional [representative] 
for each 100k residents 
0.769 0.839 30.80 
C 
Base of three [representatives], 
one [representative] for each 
100k residents 
0.833 0.800 27.80 
D 
One [representative] per 30,000 
residents 
0.526 0.960 42.10 
E Two votes per 75,000 residents 0.625 0.922 37.50 
F 
Southwest Michigan RPC 
(Niles/Benton Harbor) 
0.676 0.895 35.14 
G 
West Michigan RPC (Grand 
Rapids) 
0.714 0.776 23.81 
 
Figure 9 shows how the seven proposed collective choice arrangements are plotted based 
on IMS and PPS. Each of these options is consistent with the large-n sample results identified in 
Chapter 4. In fact, all seven options are strongly in the upper-right quadrant where both IMS and 
PPS are maximized. Among the seven alternatives, Option B (the adopted alternative) splits the 
difference between proposal that trend more towards “one-person, one-vote” (Options D-F) or 
more towards “one-member, one-vote” (Options A & C), but maximizes both values more than 
Option G.  
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Figure 9 Board Structure Alternatives for SMPC Plotted by IMS and PPS 
 
 
Local governments undertaking collaborative activities delegated to institutions like 
RIGOs have a responsibility to their citizens to evaluate and negotiate their specific 
representational rights within that organization. However, the role of RIGO professional staff 
like Lee Adams is to think of what is good for the whole organization. Because of his prior 
experience, he generated a statistic similar to the PPS to measure the population proportionality 
of each proposed collective choice arrangement. Informed by those calculations, he was able to 
provide context to his recommendation that struck an appropriate balance between institutional 
membership and population proportionality. IMS and PPS can help designers of collective 
choice arrangement proposals see the impact of aggregated representational rights to ensure a 
variety of options. These variables scatter-plotted together can also readily demonstrate to local 
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government members that one need not sacrifice population proportionality for institutional 
membership or vice versa. 
5.2 Sacramento Area Council of Governments 
The history of the Sacramento Area Council of Governments (SACOG) and its 
predecessor, the Sacramento Regional Area Planning Commission (SRAPC), demonstrate that 
collective choice arrangements evolve and innovate to meet members’ needs in a changing 
environment. Sacramento County has remained the “great power” since SACOG’s founding; it 
has always constituted at least 60% of SACOG’s population. Sacramento County (including the 
City of Sacramento and its incorporated suburbs) has agreed to a variety of collective choice 
arrangements with its neighbors and its municipalities over this time, shedding light on the 
complexities of these relationships, beyond “one-member, one-vote.” The region tripled in 
population between 1960 and 2010. Municipalities were incorporated, adjacent territory was 
annexed, and consolidations were considered. As a result, changes in both demographic and 
political structures put pressure on SACOG’s collective choice arrangements. Members 
withdrew from SACOG over these issues, and they returned under different agreements.  
I begin this section by providing some brief context of the six-county region in which 
SACOG currently operates. Then, I outline the history of the changes to SACOG’s membership 
and collective choice arrangements over time from SRAPC’s founding in 1965 to the 2003 JPA 
that is still in place today. I use the IMS and PPS methods presented in Chapter 4 to 
quantitatively demonstrate these changes. These values are products of the negotiation process 
and changes in political structure and population, they do not explain why or how these changes 
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were enacted. Finally, I discuss the current triple-threshold model SACOG currently uses 
adopted in the 2003 JPA. 
 
5.2.1  Background on the Sacramento Region 
The current footprint of SACOG covers six California counties (El Dorado, Placer, 
Sacramento, Sutter, Yolo, and Yuba). This region is home to more than 2.3 million people; it is 
the twenty-first largest RIGO in the United States. These six counties collectively have twenty-
two municipalities with a substantial portion of the region also living in unincorporated areas. 
The largest of these municipalities is the City of Sacramento (2010 Census Population: 466,488, 
20.14% of RIGO population). Two Sacramento suburbs have more than 100,000 people: Elk 
Grove (Sacramento County) and Roseville (Placer County).  
The six-county region experienced tremendous and uneven growth between the founding 
of SRAPC in 1963 and the 2003 Joint Powers Agreement. Unlike many of the rust belt and 
northeastern cities where center cities or urban counties lost population due to suburbanization 
during these years (Teaford, 1990), the Sacramento region saw growth throughout, but in uneven 
amounts. El Dorado County was 432% more populous in 2000 than it was in 1960; Placer 
County grew at a 336% rate in the same time frame. Meanwhile, Yuba County grew, but only at 
a 78% rate47. Municipalities incorporated as suburbanization continued and the City of 
                                                 
47 Values generated from “1850-2010 Historical US Census Populations of Counties and Incorporated 
Cities/Towns in California” http://www.dof.ca.gov/Reports/Demographic_Reports/documents/2010-
1850_STCO_IncCities-FINAL.xls 
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Sacramento struggled to keep pace. Since the 1960 Census, six municipalities have incorporated 
in the region and the City of North Sacramento consolidated with the City of Sacramento. 
Between 1960 and 2000, the City of Sacramento population more than doubled, but shrank as a 
proportion of the six-county region’s population from 26.5% to 21%.  
Sacramento County has always held the majority of population in the region, and remains 
so today. The county grew 143% between 1960-2010, but declined as a percent the six-county 
region’s population from 70% to 61%. However much like their Northeast and Rust Belt 
counterparts (Glass, 2011; Teaford, 1990), civic and business interests rallied for a more logical 
organization for local governments putting forward two separate city-county consolidation 
referenda (1974 and 1990) for Sacramento; both failed (Sparrow, 2004). 
The six-county region includes the bulk of the Sacramento Valley, but extends far enough 
eastward to include California communities in the Sierra Nevada mountains abutting Lake 
Tahoe. These communities (both incorporated and unincorporated) are closer to Reno and 
Carson City, Nevada than they are to Sacramento.  A bi-state compact formed the Tahoe 
Regional Planning Agency (TRPA) that includes representation from Placer and El Dorado 
county governments and the City of South Lake Tahoe (CA). The City of South Lake Tahoe is a 
member of TRPA. TRPA is an important actor that ties regional governance on environmental 
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conservation and economic development across state lines for the Lake Tahoe region, but is not, 
strictly speaking, a RIGO48.  
5.2.2  Utilizing IMS and PPS to Trace a RIGO’s Collective Choice Arrangements Over 
Time 
This section demonstrates how the Institutional Membership Scores and Population 
Proportionality Scores can change over time within the same organization. Together, the IMS 
and PPS values over time provide a more comprehensive view of how amendments and revisions 
affect a RIGO’s (or other similar body’s) collective choice arrangements than has been provided 
in the literature to date. The six-county region surrounding Sacramento, California served by the 
Sacramento Area Regional Planning Commission (1965-1980), and its successor, the 
Sacramento Area Council of Governments (1980-present), provides an excellent example of how 
these measures of collective choice arrangements can change over time. The region’s economic 
and migration boom created constantly shifting population disparities among local governments 
and the incorporation of new municipalities.   
I use the same methods presented in Chapter 3 and the same formulas as in Chapter 4 to 
show this change over time. The timeline of SACOG and SRAPC history is provided in the 2016 
                                                 
48 TRPA meets many of the criteria of a RIGO in its ambition, legitimacy, agenda, but does not meet the 
membership criteria. As of 2018, only six of the fifteen members represented local governments. Eight of the 
members were state officials or appointees from either California or Nevada and one is a presidential appointee.   
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SACOG handbook (pg. 22). For population information, I use a table of Census data49 provided 
by the State of California. Joint Powers Agreements (JPA) were provided by SACOG and online 
searches. In some cases, only draft versions of JPAs were recovered. These were used to code 
the prior collective choice agreements only when modifications were clearly marked (e.g. 
strikethroughs and underlines). In some cases to better reflect the regional growth of the time, I 
evaluate the collective choice arrangements a year after they were initiated to use the more 
accurate Census data. Within SRAPC and SACOG, all selection is internal to the local 
government members and I do not evaluate who may sit as a representative for the local 
governments. Exceptions to these methods are noted, as applicable. 
The information provided here is presented more as proof of concept than history. I have 
reasonable confidence that what is provided here sufficiently represents the path SRAPC and 
SACOG have gone through in their collective choice arrangements. Where I am unclear on what 
a document may have said, I note the limitations as appropriate. More importantly for clarity’s 
sake, I am not trying to explain why shifts in collective choice arrangements occurred. These 
decisions involve many other factors that are not directly reflected by the IMS and PPS, for 
example, changes to the policy portfolio or the negotiating skills of those representing local 
governments. IMS and PPS represent the magnitude of the changes that happened over time that 
can then be pursued for in-depth analysis to better understand the mechanisms that caused 
changes to the JPA. Table 10 summarizes these collective choice arrangements. 
                                                 
49 Values generated from “1850-2010 Historical US Census Populations of Counties and Incoporated 
Cities/Towns in California” http://www.dof.ca.gov/Reports/Demographic_Reports/documents/2010-
1850_STCO_IncCities-FINAL.xls 
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5.2.3  Timeline of Changes 
The Sacramento Regional Area Planning Commission (SRAPC) was formed in 1965 
through a Joint Powers Agreement (JPA) among four counties (El Dorado, Placer, Sacramento, 
and Yolo) and their thirteen cities. Despite extensive searches this document could not be 
recovered, however a variety of documents give clues as to how the organization was initially set 
up. Records show that the organization provided one seat per county and that the thirteen 
municipalities were provided multijurisdictional membership with representation rotated in some 
fashion (Sacramento Area Council of Governments, n.d.). All thirteen municipalities remain 
members regardless of the rotation method, but the details of how representation manifests could 
yield different results. However, reasonable assumptions can be imputed here. The 1980 records 
(which would reflect a 1974 JPA) show six municipal commissioners (Hatfield, 1980). In the 
absence of better information, I assume six municipal representatives at this point in the 
organization’s history and collective multi-jurisdictional membership for all thirteen 
municipalities.  
As “great powers” in the region, Sacramento County and the City of Sacramento both 
accepted a less population proportional collective choice arrangement in the 1965 JPA. Based on 
the 1960 Census data, Sacramento County had more than three quarters of the SRAPC 
population. Despite that, the county has one vote on the board for its more than 500,000 
residents, with almost 300,000 of these residents living in unincorporated areas. The remaining 
nine members serve on average about 45,000 people.  The City of Sacramento accepted some 
form of seat rotation with twelve other municipalities, even though it retained more than 70% of 
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the municipal population in SRAPC50. Based on the assumptions above, SRAPC begins with an 
IMS of .500 and a PPS of .52951. 
By 1970, Sutter and Yuba Counties and their four collective municipalities collectively 
joined SRAPC through amendments to the SRAPC JPA (signed in 196952). Sutter and Yuba 
counties were two of the three smallest in SRAPC at the time. Both counties had grown in 
population by more than 25% since the 1960 Census; they were booming like the rest of the 
region. This allowed SRAPC to expand its reach to the growing northern valleys. Again, this 
version of the JPA is pieced together based on assumptions from historical records. Under the 
same collective choice arrangements of one vote per county and six rotating seats for multi-
jurisdictional municipal membership, the 1970 IMS increased to .583 and PPS increased to .592. 
In Figure 5, this shift would move the organization more towards the upper-right corner where 
both IMS and PPS are maximized. 
In 1974, a new JPA reflected two major changes to SRAPC: a permanent seat for the City 
of Sacramento and the withdrawal of El Dorado and Placer counties “due to concerns of valley 
                                                 
50 By 1965, the City of Sacramento had merged with North Sacramento. This percentage reflects the 1960 
populations of both municipalities over the total population in incorporated areas of SRAPC. 
51 It seems unlikely SRAPC would provide rotation to more than six municipalities. This hypothetical 
scenario would put these four counties (all with majority populations in unincorporated area in 1960) at an even 
greater disadvantage.  In an alternate scenario where the 1965 JPA provided only four seats for municipalities to 
keep the number of votes equal to counties, the IMS increases to .625 and the PPS increases to .553 (moving more 
towards the upper-right corner in Figure 5). The remaining seven representatives (excluding Sacramento County) 
would represent about 58,500 citizens on average. 
52 Measured in 1970 to reflect census changes and the merger of the cities of North Sacramento and 
Sacramento that happened after the 1960 Census. 
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dominance” (Sacramento Area Council of Governments, 2016, pg. 22). Without accounting for 
growth between 1970 and 1974, these two changes simultaneously occurring dramatically 
decrease the PPS from .592 before the 1947 JPA to .299.  Sacramento County is now a larger 
percentage of a smaller region without substantial changes in representational rights. The City of 
Sacramento now has a permanent representative ensuring a voice at the table for its more than 
250,000 residents, but now the remaining municipalities in SRAPC have five representatives for 
just over 100,000 people. 
In 1980, the local governments restructured and renamed the organization to the 
Sacramento Area Council of Governments. Three Placer County municipalities are now 
members (Loomis, Rocklin, and Roseville), but the county government has not rejoined. The 
new JPA implemented weighted voting that gave Sacramento County three votes and the City of 
Sacramento two votes53; it also provided a single municipal representative for each of the five 
counties. This structure creates five multi-jurisdictional members for each county rather than one 
multi-jurisdictional member for all fourteen municipalities. This increase in the number of 
members is the primary cause for the IMS rising to .769; the weighted votes for Sacramento 
County and the City of Sacramento are the main driver in the PPS increasing to .520. Sacramento 
County has one vote per more than 250,000 people; two other counties (Sutter and Yuba) have 
one vote each for about 50,000 people. The City of Sacramento has two votes for over 275,000 
people; no county’s municipal multi-jurisdictional member has more than 70,000 people. Even 
under this weighted formula, the largest local governments still agree to collective choice 
                                                 
53 These votes can be held by a single representative or split by representatives at the local government’s 
discretion. 
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arrangements where smaller municipalities and counties have population disproportional 
representational rights. 
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Table 10 Timeline of Changes to SRAPC/SACOG Collective Choice Arrangements 
Year # of 
Counties 
# of 
Municipalities 
Sacramento County 
of RIGO Population 
IMS PPS Notes 
1965 4 13 77% .500 .529 Initial Formation of 
SRAPC 
1970 6 17 68% .583 .592 Addition of Sutter 
and Yuba Counties 
(JPA signed 1969) 
1974 4 12 76% .600 .299 Withdrawal of El 
Dorado, Placer 
Counties54; 
Permanent Seat for 
Sacramento City 
1980 4 14 76% .769 .520 Weighted formula; 
changes name to 
SACOG 
1990 4 15 76% .769 .533 No major changes; 
census update to 
reflect growth 
2000a 6 18 63% .632 .536 (Reflects Unweighted 
Voting Rules) 
 
Major municipal 
incorporations; 
rejoining of El 
Dorado and Placer 
Counties 
2000b 6 18 63% .500 .697 (Reflects Weighted 
Voting Rules 
requiring 2/3rds 
majority) 
 
 
  
                                                 
54 The City of Roseville in Placer County remained a member of SRAPC. 
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Between 1980 and 1990, collective choice arrangements remained relatively stable but 
the region continued growing. Every local government over 1,000 people that belongs to 
SACOG grows by at least ten percent in just the ten years between 1980 and 1990; cities like 
Rocklin and Folsom more than double in population in that time. The newly incorporated Yolo 
County municipality of West Sacramento (1990 population: 28,898) joins SACOG in 1988. Even 
though no relevant amendments or revisions occurred to these sections of the JPA, growth in the 
suburbs of Sacramento County and the municipalities in Placer County marginally increased the 
PPS to .533. 
By 2000, SACOG had once again revised the collective choice arrangements in their JPA 
and added new members. El Dorado County and Placer County rejoined; two large, newly 
incorporated cities in Sacramento County joined as well (Citrus Heights and Elk Grove) as did 
the City of Auburn. The 1999 JPA (City of Sacramento, 1999) now provides for two-stage 
voting rules: unweighted and weighted. The unweighted voting rules mostly extends the previous 
collective choice arrangements, but now gives multijurisdictional municipal members an 
additional representative for each 100,000 in population or fraction thereof. The growth and 
incorporation of new suburban Sacramento County municipalities meant an increase in 
population from just under 40,000 to more than 225,000 between 1990 and 200055. This rule 
increased the number of votes for multijurisdictional municipal members of Placer, Sacramento, 
and Yolo Counties; thus, this reduced the IMS to .632. The combination of new members, 
                                                 
55 Elk Grove incorporated on July 1, 2000 and was not included in the 2000 Census. Population estimated 
from Elk Grove CDP provided by the City of Elk Grove: 
http://www.elkgrovecity.org/city_hall/departments_divisions/planning/additional_resources/census_2000_informati
on. This likely underestimates the true population as of incorporation. 
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population change, and these rules allowed the PPS for the unweighted voting rules to remain 
relatively similar to where it was in 1990.  
The weighted voting rules provide for an entirely different set of representational rights, 
when a motion and a second are recognized after an unweighted vote. The weighted vote 
requires a two-thirds majority for adoption. Table 11 shows how these representational rights 
were provided: 
Table 11 Weighted Voting Values under SACOG 1999 JPA 
Member Base Value 1 Vote Added for each 100,000 People Above56: 
Sacramento County57 6 700,000 (Unincorporated Area) 
City of Sacramento8 4 500,000 
Other Counties 0 100,000 
All Other Representatives 1 N/A 
 
Using 2000 Census populations, these weighted voting rules have the highest PPS values 
of any set of collective choice arrangements in SACOG/SRAPC to this point. Sacramento 
County, the City of Sacramento, and its suburbs hold eleven weighted votes of the total twenty 
four; this would require only a small handful of other representatives to overturn an unweighted 
vote. As a result, the “great powers” do not have collective veto power, but they do retain 
substantial leverage. However, this two-stage voting structure did not last for very long.  
 
                                                 
56 Or fraction thereof. 
57 Votes for the City and County of Sacramento are split when multiple representatives are present. 
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5.2.4  The 2003 Joint Powers Agreement 
The 2003 Joint Powers Agreement requires a triple-majority to adopt policy: a majority 
of the twenty-two member municipalities, a majority of the six counties, and a majority of the 
population represented by those member governments58. Under a single voting rule, SACOG 
now has collective choice arrangements that maximize institutional membership and population 
proportionality. This system does not give the largest local governments or the collective smaller 
local governments dominance over the agenda, and distributes veto power similarly. The system 
is adaptable for new municipal incorporations and responds to population growth and decline. 
Since it was adopted in 2003, no amendments to the collective choice arrangements section of 
the Joint Powers Arrangements have been ratified and no members have withdrawn. 
So far as research has indicated, this triple-threshold testing innovation is unique to 
SACOG. Other multiple-testing RIGOs found within the random sample are either single county 
(San Diego), or do not distinguish between municipalities and counties in their institutional 
membership vote (Phoenix and Detroit). SACOG has clearly made several revisions to their 
collective choice arrangements over time before the 2003 JPA was implemented. It would seem 
that SACOG has found a path towards consensus for its members. One SACOG representative 
described the current system this way:  
 
To keep all jurisdictions participating, we have to ensure that all 
jurisdictions are treated both fairly and equitably—and there is a difference.  Our 
votes must have a majority of both cities and counties or they fail.  So everyone 
knows that we need to find broadly applicable solutions, not just ones that benefit 
just the cities or just the counties. (Tom Stallard, personal correspondence) 
                                                 
58 County populations are limited to unincorporated areas. 
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In demonstrating how changes in collective choice arrangements affect the IMS and PPS 
values, it is clear there is a much larger story here. The timeline shows how substantial the 1974 
withdrawal of El Dorado and Placer Counties was on the population proportionality of SRAPC’s 
collective choice arrangements, but does not give reasoning why beyond “valley dominance” 
(Sacramento Area Council of Governments, 2016, pg. 22). The timeline begs similar questions 
as to the causes of the adoption of a weighted formula or the adoption of the two-stage rule. The 
causal pathways that describe why these changes occur are likely larger and more complex than 
just population change and changes to the landscape of local governments in the region.  The 
political history and culture of a region, changes to state legislation, and the personalities of the 
people involved all likely contribute to governing documents’ amendments and revisions 
individually and synergistically.  
5.3 Conclusion 
This chapter demonstrates how IMS and PPS can be used to quantify inflection points in 
a RIGO’s (or other similar organizational) history of collective choice arrangements. While 
scholarly literature currently lacks a systematic review of these organizations’ histories and has 
collected limited data, these methods can be a valuable tool to shed light on the decisions boards 
make among proposals for collective choice arrangements and how they adjust them to respond 
to changes in their environments. Information is scarce about how these decisions are made both 
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at the organizational genesis and in evolution over time. However, I present here two 
considerations that seem worthy of further exploration. 
In some cases, decisions about how local government representational rights are 
apportioned may be influenced by the options presented and recommendations of professional 
staff.  At the inception of a new organization, representatives will have a variety of competing 
priorities. As a result, professional staff may take on a larger role in the design of collective 
choice arrangement proposals like Mr. Adams did in SMPC. Thoughtful, comprehensive 
proposals can build trust between members and professional staff by demonstrating they have an 
interest in fair treatment. Agreeing to these initial governing documents could be seen as 
temporary to keep members together and get the organization off the ground; it is unclear how 
important these initial documents are in constraining future revisions as a result of path 
dependence. 
Informal factors may also influence the decisions to alter collective choice arrangements. 
The reputation of the local governments and its representatives could potentially play a role in 
negotiations. A long-tenured elected official with a strong network in the region could sway the 
process, meanwhile a newly-elected official without substantial experience (or worse, one with 
diminished reputation due to untrustworthiness or scandal) may have their opinions more readily 
dismissed. Similarly, the local governments themselves may have leverage or limited influence 
depending on how they maintain relationships. Bargaining and negotiating skill will likely not be 
uniform across all representatives, nor will access to outside forms of pressure through the media 
or interest groups (e.g. chambers of commerce or regional civic institutions). 
With such limited information about how these decision-making processes occur, it is 
tough to trace through all the potential influences. The methods underlying IMS and PPS values 
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applied to a RIGO’s negotiations and evolving governing documents can identify the most 
substantial moments where the RIGO identified a need to shift its collective choice arrangements 
for further investigation. Understanding why will require more records, a deeper understanding 
of the region and its local governments, and more detailed analysis. 
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6.0 Conclusion 
 
The challenge of scholarship, particularly in professional schools, is to bridge the gap 
between theory and practice and “design research that produces actionable knowledge for 
practical problems” (Van de Ven, 2007).  Actionable knowledge can provide applications of 
theory as well as larger frames around which inductive knowledge can be better understood. In 
this vein, I conclude the dissertation with a summary of findings that demonstrates some of the 
key findings from the prior five chapters and their application for practitioners like RIGO 
executive directors and key stakeholders like local government members and state policymakers. 
Finally, I present a potential future research agenda resulting from the findings in this 
dissertation.  
6.1 Summary of Findings 
 
Table 12 provides a brief summary of the most significant findings of the dissertation. 
However, in this section, I reframe these contributions away from the academic literature. 
Instead, I present practical applications of these findings for the benefit of RIGO practitioners 
and stakeholders. 
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Table 12 Summary of Findings 
Prior Conventional Wisdom Contribution of Dissertation 
1) One-member, one-vote collective choice 
arrangements are the dominant form in regional 
councils. 
 
(Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental 
Relations, 1973; Wyman, 1994) 
1) RIGOs operate under a variety of complex 
collective choice arrangements that balance 
institutional membership and population 
proportionality, among other factors. These balances 
can be evaluated amongst proposed alternatives and 
evaluated as the organization evolves. 
 
2) Large cities are under-represented in their 
representational rights relative to their population; 
this limits organizations like RIGOs to the lowest 
common denominator problems. 
 
(Hall, 2009; Orfield & Dawes, 2016; Sanchez, 
2006) 
2a) With limited exceptions, RIGOs with large cities 
demonstrate they account for population 
proportionality, but still retain a collective veto for 
smaller members. 
 
2b) The statutory authority of a RIGO and the policy 
areas a RIGO undertakes can be parsed from its 
collective choice arrangements, though they may 
relate to one another. 
 
3) To date, cross-boundary intergovernmental 
organizations largely have been understood as a 
specific type of interlocal activity to be compared 
with other types of interlocal activity. 
 
 (Barnes & Foster, 2012; Feiock, 2009; Tavares & 
Feiock, 2017) 
 
3) Importing selected elements of the international 
organizations literature can enrich our understanding 
of RIGOs. We can use this scholarship to more 
rigorously model some elements of RIGO 
governance and develop research questions to 
understand the informal governance of these bodies 
and the role of large cities. 
4) Elected officials are largely absent from 
interjurisdictional activity; the networks and ethos 
of professional staff are the main drivers for 
collaborative interlocal activity. 
 
(Frederickson, 1999) 
4) Elected officials comprise the majority of 
representatives to an average RIGO board, and 
citizens appointed on behalf of the local government 
comprise a substantial minority. Professional staff 
rarely acts as a representative on behalf of their local 
government. The implications and details of this are 
not yet understood. 
 
5) There is currently no national registry of 
governing documents for cross-boundary 
intergovernmental organizations. 
 
(Gerber & Gibson, 2009; Nelson, Sanchez, Wolf, & 
Farquhar, 2003) 
5) From this project, there is now a library of 
hundreds of documents from more than 250 RIGOs 
so far. I am not permitted to publish these documents 
by some RIGOs, but interested scholars can contact 
me for more information.  
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Most importantly for practitioners, this research is a key step in building a toolbox of 
resources to help RIGOs modify their collective choice arrangements as the needs of the 
organization and the region evolve. I have rejected consistently throughout the dissertation the 
idea that there is an optimal or preferred model for the representational rights of local 
government members. My research has demonstrated that RIGOs customize responses to 
differences in members’ populations and the local government structures in place in a given 
region (#1 in Table 12); however, these are not the only two factors that can impact collective 
choice arrangements. Local governments’ desire for a stake in the decisions of a RIGO also 
could shift as relationships among members strengthen or erode, federal and state incentives 
expand or contract, or as RIGOs undertake new issues, policies, and programs. With a growing 
compendium of governance documents from across the country (#5 in Table 12), the opportunity 
to develop proposals based on the experience of others in similar circumstances has never been 
easier. As RIGOs respond to these shifts, the scatterplots developed in Chapter 4 and 5 are one 
visually intuitive way to assess how different proposals would affect a region’s local 
governments in total, rather than showing individually how each member would be affected.  
Investigating the role large cities play within a RIGO (#2a in Table 12) is one lens 
through which we can better understand the strategies local government members (of all sizes) 
exercise to ensure their objectives are achieved. The prior academic literature largely has 
characterized center cities as having equal representational rights to their neighboring suburban 
and rural jurisdictions. My research shows those “one-member, one-vote” models are 
substantially less prevalent than has been acknowledged to date, especially in RIGOs with a city 
of more than 200,000 people. Furthermore, membership is not defined consistently both within 
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and across RIGOs (and other similar bodies); the combination of counties, municipalities, and 
multijurisdictional members varies substantially. Why, when, and how the principal city (or 
cities) in a region choose to collaborate with their fellow local governments and the professional 
staff of a RIGO can shed important light about how to build a thriving region (either 
competitively or cooperatively). While the focus in one component of the dissertation has been 
about cities of 200,000 people or more, some quantitative indications suggest the ratio of 
population between the center city (or cities) to other members may be more important to the 
collective choice arrangements than the overall population59. 
The interactions among local government members are a product of the people who 
represent them; within RIGOs, these are primarily elected officials and appointed citizens (#4 in 
Table 12). The public administration literature has researched extensively how professional staff 
works across jurisdictions, but there are very few findings about the role elected officials play in 
working collaboratively across boundaries (examples: Feiock, Lee, Park, & Lee, 2010; Gerber & 
Gibson, 2009; Matkin & Frederickson, 2009). We know even less about the role local 
government appointed citizens play on the boards of cross-boundary intergovernmental 
organization (see Dougherty & Miller in Miller, Nelles, Dougherty, & Rickabaugh, 2018).  In the 
vein of Van de Ven’s “engaged scholarship” (2007), this is a space where future research should 
be driven by the needs of practitioners. Elected officials, appointed citizens, municipal and 
county staff, and RIGO staff know better how their processes work; they can assist academics in 
                                                 
59 As a hypothetical example, a three-member RIGO with populations of 500,000, 200,000, and 100,000 
(total population: 900,000) probably has more similarities in collective choice arrangement to a three-member RIGO 
with populations of 50,000, 20,000, and 10,000 (total population: 90,000) than it does to a three-member RIGO with 
populations of 300,000 each (total population: 900,000). 
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finding the key decision points and stress points to better our understanding and the gaps where 
rigorous research can be most beneficial. 
The work RIGOs do is in a unique space among the cooperative options available to local 
governments, but the relationships it builds have strong parallels with international organizations 
that can bring more rigorous research methods and practical research questions (#3 in Table 12). 
Both RIGOs and international organizations exist to serve their members and create collective 
gains from cooperation and coordinating. However, both classes of organizations are constrained 
also by their government members’ desire for autonomy and internal control. The international 
organizations literature has a deep understanding of how trust is built among members, in 
particular when those members have inequalities in size (of population, of economies, etc.). This 
literature has evaluated the customs and norms developed to ensure reciprocation and how 
collective choice arrangements evolve to meet member needs. Most practically, this body of 
research has connected these questions to why these forms of collaboration meet their members’ 
objectives, lose relevance, or even dissolve. The findings of international organizations 
scholarship can be examined to develop best practices to assist RIGOs in meeting the goals their 
local government members seek to achieve. These findings will not be a turnkey perfect fit; there 
are certainly limitations to the parallels.  
Finally, this dissertation has actively separated the collective choice arrangements of a 
RIGO from the roles that local, state and federal governments have granted the RIGO (#2b in 
Table 12). This is likely to be the largest difference between international organizations and 
RIGOs. The state and federal government has granted the authority to RIGOs to pursue various 
activities, provided resources to incentivize cooperation on certain activities, and in some cases 
put constraints on collective choice arrangements. However, the portfolio of policies a RIGO 
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undertakes is not entirely derived from higher levels of government. As a result of local 
government initiatives, RIGOs take on regional challenges like rural broadband, climate 
resilience planning, and eliminating food deserts. My dissertation is an initial step in redefining 
this distinction; this research works towards building new perceptions that (1) RIGOs take on 
policy challenges as a result of local government initiative, not just through state or federal 
mandate, (2) a RIGO’s policy portfolio is distinct from its collective choice arrangements, but 
that (3) the collective choice arrangements and policy portfolios can affect one another. 
6.2 Future Research Agenda 
The five major categories of contributions outlined in Table 12 open up promising lines 
of research to be explored going forward. In this section, I focus on two potential future avenues 
that build on existing work and apply these findings. First, I describe how the two measures of 
collective choice arrangements developed in this dissertation can be used as a dependent variable 
to understand how they are affected by the diffusion of local governments within a region. I also 
suggest how these measures can be applied, as independent variables, to better understand how 
projects and funding are distributed within a region. The second potential avenue investigates the 
decision-making process beyond the formal governance documents and evaluating the informal 
norms, customs, and strategies local governments and RIGO staff use to build trust, negotiate 
proposals, and ensure their objectives are achieved. 
The Institutional Membership Score (IMS) and Population Proportionality Score (PPS) 
demonstrated earlier indicate substantial variation in the collective choice arrangements of 
RIGOs, but how this variation correlates as an independent or dependent variable has yet to be 
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explored. It seems logical that the complexity of local governments throughout a given region 
would correlate to the results of the RIGO’s collective choice arrangements; however this has not 
yet been tested. Dougherty & Miller (in Miller et al., 2018) have developed a measure of this 
complexity by RIGO boundaries, but these factors have not yet been considered together. Gerber 
and Gibson (2009) and Nelson et al. (2003) have both tried to tie the limited governance 
information available of Metropolitan Planning Organizations at the time to Transportation 
Improvement Program reports to understand if these collective choice arrangements contribute to 
certain outcomes. These studies can be improved upon with a large compendium of governance 
documents and expanded to include other federal or state roles RIGOs pursue where financial 
and project reporting is consistent, such as Economic Development Districts. Identifying which 
collective choice arrangements correlate strongly to more growth-focused outcomes, urban-
focused outcomes, or equity-focused outcomes could give RIGOs new tools to move in their 
desired direction. 
However, even findings that show correlations between collective choice arrangements 
and outcomes would only unpack some of the black box; understanding how RIGO decision-
making occurs requires going beyond the formal governance documents. Three highly inter-
related aspects of this process build off this research most directly: the perceptions of 
representatives, the informal norms of the organization, and the underlying administrative 
structures. Research is scarce about the motivations of elected officials and citizen 
representatives and how they view their roles on RIGO boards (Matkin & Frederickson, 1999). 
Identifying what informs representatives’ decision-making processes and how the negotiations 
among members (among the elected officials or the professional staff of the local governments) 
occur are both crucial to understanding the policy decisions the RIGO makes. The international 
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organizations literature has begun exploring how norms, customs, and informal governance 
strategies affect the policy outcomes beyond the collective choice arrangements (Dreher et al., 
2009; Stone, 2013; Strand & Tuman, 2012). In addition, that field has looked extensively at how 
members delegate to professional staff in international organizations using a principal-agent 
model affected by formal governance documents and informal norms and customs (Cortell & 
Peterson, 2006; Hawkins, Darren G. Lake, David A., Nielson, Daniel L. and Tierney, 2006; 
Hawkins & Jacoby, 2006; Lyne, Nielson, & Tierney, 2006). 
The international organizations theories can be tested within RIGOs to understand these 
interactions, but the benefits can be reciprocal. I have made the case for the parallels between 
international organizations and RIGOs throughout the dissertation, but only from the RIGO’s 
perspective. There may be instances where RIGOs can be a large-n proxy to test interactions 
among members untestable with a limited number of highly specialized international 
organizations. The formal collective choice arrangements matter in setting a foundation for these 
norms and customs to develop, but the decision-making process is much more complex than the 
governance documents alone. 
 
6.3 Conclusion 
Regional Intergovernmental Organizations occupy a particularly rare place in the 
American political landscape in 2018. RIGOs are a forum where the urban, suburban, and rural 
elected officials meet on a regular basis out of the spotlight to work together. These elected 
officials represent incorporated places with names, not gerrymandered districts that change 
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because of Census results and political whims. These incorporated places have histories and 
cultures that inform the futures their citizens want for their neighborhood and the larger region of 
which they are a part. Leaders from all these varied places collaborate to develop programs to 
improve their region, and make them a reality. It may not always be easy for these leaders to find 
common ground, but nevertheless, they often do.  
So frequently these days, the conversation turns towards how divided America is or how 
coarse the debate has become; no one silver bullet exists to solve a problem that complex. 
However, RIGOs are a space where the elected leaders of our country are bridging those divides 
and taking action collectively. The trust necessary to take that action collectively is predicated on 
agreeing to rules, both formal and informal, and sticking by those rules even when the vote goes 
against your interest. Understanding the governance of an organization is not just learning the 
rules for their own sake or for advantage; it is learning a bit more about how Reno sits down with 
ranchers on the Nevada frontier or how Asheville can share with North Carolina tobacco farming 
communities. Perhaps there is something to be learned here that can be applied in other political 
forums. 
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